A close friend, who was hired to assess the feasibility of automating government procedures, told me a story. His Secretary, a Grade-20 PAS officer, took out an old book from an exquisite wooden bookshelf and waved it in front of them. “This code is what I am running this department with and it was written by the British 80 years ago,” the Secretary declared.

My friend thought that the Secretary was probably lamenting the obsolete system and would automation a green signal. But the seasoned administration expert was extolling the code for supposedly standing the test of time. The irony achieved an entirely different level when it is considered that the department he was leading had “engineering” in its name.

This example offers a glimpse into the workings of governance establishment of Pakistan.

The DMG/PAS group is a remnant of the service branch responsible for state land and revenue management in British times

Many branches of civil service qualify as bureaucracy in Pakistan, but none has the exposure to governance hotspots, access to resources, and training facilities more than one cadre: the Central Superior Services (CSS). These officers are selected through extensive country-wide competitive written and psychological exams. Candidates are assigned to service groups and most of them stay in them till retirement (Foreign Service, Police, Customs, Income Tax, etc.). There is, however one exception: the former District Management Group (DMG) now Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS).

The DMG/PAS group is a remnant of the service branch responsible for state land and revenue management in British times. These civil servants wielded enormous colonial powers during a time which they refer to as “its prime”. Even as recently as twenty-five years ago, these officers (Assistant and Deputy Commissioners) were solely responsible for the maintenance of law and order (policing) as well as judicial duties in a district.

These powers made sense in colonial times as the Raj’s main objective was to collect revenue. Keeping the peace was subservient to the operation of land-based revenue collection. The malia, lagan etc. ended after Independence, but policing and justice stayed with these offices for more than 50 years. Judicial was taken away in 1998 and policing in 2002—but the attitudes, unfortunately, lived on.

The distinctive trade and training of these officers is land management

The distinctive trade and training of these officers is land management. After Independence, most land-based revenue collection ceased and of all the land-related functions (what remained) concerned taxes on transfers of lands and management of the land record. However, a cursory glance at the conditions of state land management structure gives a sense of the competency of its operators.

The routine operation of Settlement of Land (or band-o-bast) could be completed only once as opposed to a schedule of once every twenty years. In today’s world of digital geodesy, satellite imaging, and presence of cataloguing of a complete landscape by a geological survey, the land record in Pakistan still relies on parchments (latha) and century-old ownership deeds. It is thus no surprise that the longest litigation cases (some lasting for more than 50 years) almost always involve land records.

Just like land management, the operational dynamics of these powerful offices in Pakistan changed over time. The introduction of discretionary funds (given to local political representatives) during General Zia’s era, brought this group in direct contact with the political class, perhaps for the first time on equal footing. This brought other public execution departments into the sphere of their influence.

At around the time, “lateral induction”, a euphemism for induction of DMG/PAS officers into other services, also started. During the course of their service at the district and constituency levels, these officers developed bonds of loyalty with politicians which, over time, turned into purely utilitarian relationships. These relations helped place them at key positions at higher levels (secretarial/BPS-20 and above) which were formerly (and rightly) manned by members of the Office Management Group who had almost no exposure to local politics and thus did their work with relative impartiality.

By positioning themselves at key human resource management appointments (establishment department) the group slowly turned the once fabled “iron-frame of the state” into a rotten oligarchy of sorts. More than 70% of positions above BPS-20 at the provincial level and more than 90% at the federal level are staffed by officers from these groups; all this power for people with the sole distinctive training of “mensuration”.

The opportunities provided to civil servants, so they can be promoted up the scale, like the obligatory management courses, are extended to general officers through establishment departments. These departments decide the composition of the officers for each batch of trainees. The establishment departments (mostly headed by DMG/PAS officers) thus decide quite often coincidentally in favor of their comrades-in-arms. Most of the time, these opportunities are provided to this particular group through quotas etc. that is, with little or no competition.

A leadership position in government would demand a person have acumen, proven managerial skill and training and experience, among other qualities. The only distinctive training (or the original trade) of DMG/PAS officers is land revenue management at the induction level (BPS-17). They then build upon their experience and exposure through training and skill development opportunities which are doled out to them during their career’s lifespan. It is only on the basis of these trainings and courses at later stages that these officers are deemed fit or “superior” (ironically, by themselves) to head provincial and federal government departments like health, engineering, industry, education etc. most which are poles apart in operation and function in comparison to the original trade of this cadre of officers.

What this charade of “superior” service has actually done to governance structures and general public service delivery in Pakistan needs no further elaboration. The incompetence combined with the organizational nepotism, which guarantees an uncontested upward mobility in rank and perk, eventually leads to the absence for the need to understand the work being done and a shameful lack of commitment to professional standards.

Almost no provincial department in any province has seen any effective structural revamping over the last 30 years, a textbook requirement for organizational management. To create newer high-ranking positions, instead of improving and strengthening the existing departments ad-hoc structures were set up to perform even the most routine state operations (water and sanitation companies, development authorities etc.).

Most government organizations today are thus understaffed, almost none have valid job descriptions for their positions and no updated legal frameworks. Except for a few departments, none have a sustainable service structure, an efficiency driven performance culture, or a public service attitude befitting a democracy.

With a few exceptions none have a departmental training regimes or functional training institutions for its officers. This, combined with the deliberate (or un-intended) attempts to keep other civil servants away from leadership positions has given rise to an officer class (loosely referred to as ex-cadre) which is mostly clueless when occasionally placed at these positions, thus perpetuating the question mark on their competency.

Provincial departments which are being led by the DMG/PAS officers are thus filled with (ex-cadre) officers who have almost no enthusiasm, ambition for excellence or attitude for public service. Some of them retire after 30 years of service at the same pay-scales they started with. The stagnancy in these organizations have given rise to a culture where change is vigorously resisted, operational jurisdictions are viciously defended, paperwork and procedures are made increasingly complicated, and decision-making consistently churns out short-term ad-hoc solutions. For a contrast, correspondence within Pakistan Army, an organization with half a million active personnel, has gone paperless during the last decade; a government department has yet to achieve that.

All these years, officers from every service branch have been forced to look up to the officers from these cadres for models as they were the ones in every leadership position. They were imitated, in their conduct with regard to work, behavior with the public and attitude towards service delivery, by every echelon of civil service, be it a peon or a departmental head. If something has had the greatest influence upon the attitudes of civil servants in Pakistan it was (and still is) this very group and by extension if there is anything wrong (or right) with the civil servants in Pakistan, it has got a lot to do with these very officers.

The writer is an ex-cadre government servant