To place the entire blame for the decline of cotton solely on research institutions is perhaps one of the greatest intellectual injustices within our agricultural system.

Today, when critics target the Central Cotton Research Institute (CCRI) or the Pakistan Central Cotton Committee (PCCC), they invariably pose a single question: “The world has advanced so far; why have we lagged?”

However, the fundamental question we must ask is: how did the world reach those heights? Was it merely the seed that guaranteed success for the United States, China, India, and Brazil, or did these nations systematically integrate research, policy, market dynamics, the farming community, and infrastructure into a cohesive value chain?

At its peak, Pakistan’s cotton production approached nearly 15 million bales; today, over recent years, it has plummeted to a mere 5.5 million bales. Attributing this decline entirely to the narrative of a “bad seed” is an evasion of reality.

Leading global cotton producers did not depend on laboratories alone.

Instead, they allocated billions of dollars to research and development, instituted farmer protection mechanisms, stabilised markets, modernised irrigation, promoted mechanised farming, and maintained continuity in agricultural policies.

Presently, China invests over 2.4 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) into Research and Development (R&D), the United States allocates over 3 percent, Brazil invests approximately 1.2 percent to 1.4 percent, and India similarly spends manifold more on agricultural research than Pakistan. Conversely, Pakistan’s total investment in R&D has dwindled to a negligible 0.16 percent of its GDP.

The dilemma then arises: how can we reasonably compare institutions in nations investing trillions in research—where scientists are equipped with cutting-edge laboratories, sustained funding, advanced genomics, machinery, meteorological data, and robust policy support—with local institutions that occasionally lack the resources even for basic salaries, field trials, fuel, machinery, and fundamental infrastructure? It is equivalent to handing someone a bicycle and expecting them to win a Formula One race.

Crop yield is not determined by genetics alone; rather, it is a product of the interplay between genetics, environment, and management practices (Yield = Genetics × Environment × Management).

Even the highest-quality seed becomes ineffective under poor water quality, extreme heat, substandard spraying practices, imbalanced fertilisation, counterfeit pesticides, market volatility, and flawed policy frameworks.

Unfortunately, the success or failure of cotton in Pakistan has been reduced strictly to the quality of the seed.

If the yield is favourable, the seed is praised; if the crop fails, the research institution is condemned.

• Is it the mandate of research institutes to enforce crop zoning?

• Is a scientist responsible for setting support prices?

• Is the containment of counterfeit pesticides the duty of a plant breeder?

• Do research institutes regulate the pricing of electricity, diesel, fertilisers, and agricultural inputs?

• Is a researcher accountable for ensuring equitable water distribution or stabilising the cotton market?

If farmers are shifting away from cotton toward sugarcane, rice, or alternative crops, the driving forces are economic realities, not merely seed quality.

In countries where cotton cultivation has succeeded globally, governments, policymakers, markets, industry, extension systems, and research institutions operate as a synchronised team.

The tragedy in Pakistan is that when the broader system fails, research institutions become the easiest scapegoats.

The farmer faces financial distress, the industry demands raw materials, and the government grapples with import burdens—yet holding the scientist solely accountable for every crisis lacks intellectual integrity.

Despite severe resource constraints, Pakistani agricultural scientists continue to sustain cotton cultivation amid climate change, emerging viral strains, whitefly attacks, water scarcity, and inconsistent policies.

If these institutions face total paralysis, Pakistan risks losing even the prospect of self-sufficiency in cotton production.

Critique is necessary, and accountability is essential—but both must be governed by fairness. If we aspire to match the standards of China, the United States, India, and Brazil, we must replicate their level of capital investment, policy continuity, farmer-centric environments, market stability, and institutional patronage.

We cite Brazil, China, and India, yet provide resources and facilities comparable to those of Cambodia.

An agricultural revolution cannot be achieved by invoking developed nations rhetorically while operating with developing-world facilitation in practice.

Today, in the backdrop of the plan to build a gymkhana on the research land of the CCRI Multan, certain circles raise questions regarding the performance and utility of the Central Cotton Research Institute (CCRI) Multan.

Such questions are often posed without due regard to historical contributions and the sustained research role that has anchored Pakistan’s cotton economy for decades.

This very institution played a decisive role in delivering the country’s historic bumper cotton crops.

For decades, CCRI Multan remained central to Pakistan’s cotton production and research system.

It has developed more than 40 cotton varieties, most of which consistently secured top positions in national trials.

For a long period, CCRI-developed varieties occupied 60–70 percent of the country’s total cotton cultivated area, forming the backbone of several major bumper harvests.

Even today, the institute continues its work. Last year, Cyto-547 achieved widespread cultivation across Punjab on hundreds of thousands of acres, and its adoption has further increased in the 2026 season.

Alongside this, research on new varieties continues, and within the next two to three years, advanced, high-yielding, and climate-resilient varieties are expected to reach farmers.

The performance of any institution must be evaluated strictly in relation to its available resources, manpower, and financial capacity.

While CCRI Multan holds a strong reputation, its operational funding is extremely limited. On one side, private seed companies generate billions of rupees in business within a single cotton season, while on the other hand, CCRI Multan operates on an estimated annual budget of approximately 250 million rupees.

Meanwhile, around 32 public and private institutions across Pakistan are engaged in cotton research and development, yet accountability is disproportionately concentrated on this single institute.

The operational environment has become so strained that employees and pensioners have faced delays in salaries and pensions for nearly ten months.

Long-standing arrears are being cleared little by little, i.e., drop by drop rather than in lump sums.

Outstanding liabilities exceed 2 billion rupees.

Despite this, scientists and staff continue their work with dignity and restraint, often without publicising their hardships.

Despite these adversities, the Cyto-547 variety has seen extensive cultivation in Punjab, with its area expanding further in 2026—demonstrating that the institute’s research continues to earn the trust of farmers even under severe financial constraints.

CCRI Multan maintains Pakistan’s largest cotton gene bank, comprising more than 6,000 germplasm accessions from 41 countries.

This genetic resource forms the foundation for developing future varieties resistant to heat, drought, viral diseases, whitefly, and other emerging climatic challenges.

Safeguarding such a national asset requires continuous funding, modern infrastructure, and strong scientific oversight—yet the institution continues to face acute financial distress while performing this critical responsibility.

It is rarely acknowledged that CCRI Multan does not receive stable, structured funding from the national exchequer.

Despite this, a public misconception persists that its employees enjoy excessive salaries and facilities.

A closer observation of field and laboratory conditions reveals scientists working under extreme heat with minimal infrastructure and limited resources.

To date, the institute has delivered over 40 cotton varieties to farmers, with nearly 90 percent consistently ranking among the top three in National Cotton Variety Trials (NCVT).

In the 2023 NCVT, Cyto-547 secured first position across Punjab against more than 80 public and private sector varieties.

When capital is constrained, manpower is limited, salaries are delayed, and basic facilities are inadequate, institutional performance must be evaluated with context and fairness.

Despite these constraints, research on multiple new strains alongside Cyto-547 continues, aiming to deliver climate-adaptive, high-yielding varieties within the next two to three years.

Even during prolonged periods of financial hardship, CCRI employees continued working for nearly three years while receiving only 30–40 percent of their salaries.

It is easy to criticise institutions; however, sustained scientific work under severe constraints can only be fully understood by those who live it.

There is an urgent need to address the structural challenges facing CCRI Multan.

A supportive institutional environment must be created, and relevant authorities must allocate adequate resources to sustain cotton research, protect the gene bank, stabilise the institution, and secure Pakistan’s agricultural future.

Weakening the research system will not affect a single institution alone—it will have far-reaching consequences for the entire agricultural and economic ecosystem of the country.