Well, it is yet another year of stabilisation. Nothing else. As someone aptly put it, the economy is being kept in an induced coma without the needed operation.

That is the art of economic management of the current team.

They say the glass is half full. However, almost every other stakeholder sees it as half empty — evident from investment-to-GDP hovering at a low rate of 13-15 percent. FDI is at a record low.

Unemployment is creeping up, and inflation is on the rise again after coming down to SBP’s medium-term range of 5-7 percent.

Call it stabilisation or stagflation — the bottom line is that the misery of the common man is nowhere close to over enough to appreciate the encouraging picture presented by the government.

The finance minister wants investment to be in the high teens and desires local investment to take the lead, with foreign investment to follow.

He knows the solution lies in lower taxation, energy, and financing costs.

He is looking at the finer points of doing away with regulatory hurdles and has emphasised policy consistency.

The only consistency about him is repeating all the pep talks, but without delivery.

Taxation on formal corporates and individuals — including all super taxes and surcharges — has only moved up in this regime and is currently at the highest-ever level in history.

Financing cost has come down over the last year, but there is not much liquidity left in the system to lend to the private sector, as the government borrows it all.

Now, the private sector and free-market champions are talking about boosting concessionary finance as the way to go.

Well, not many years ago, they bashed the subsidy model presented by the previous regime — perhaps the next may say the same for the incumbents.

They talk about the decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio.

However, they have little to say about the problem of the propensity to service debt.

They do not talk much about growing domestic debt beyond the banking sector’s capability, as SBP’s OMO injections have quadrupled in the last three years to over Rs15 trillion.

They blame external factors for worsening macro indicators lately.

They are right. Indeed, the situation has changed after the Iran-US war.

However, they have a role to play, as overreliance on the petroleum levy in days of skyrocketing international oil prices has contributed to jacking up inflation, which pushed the SBP to increase the policy rate and, in turn, increased the government’s debt-servicing bill.

That leaves less room for fiscal accommodation.

There is nothing to talk about on tax reforms. When the question was posed to the FBR chairman, he used his intelligence to outsmart the reporter by framing the answer in absolute numbers.

They explain numbers in dollars in days when the currency is overvalued, which may change in a jerk when there is a jerk in the currency.

However, he had no concrete response to the tax shortfall of Rs2.2 trillion in the last two years.

The finance team has no answer to its inability to expand the tax base and bring traders and others into the tax net.

The story is the same. Live day by day. Comply with IMF targets by taxing the same base and ask for more time before we can think of growth, as next year’s growth is likely to be below 4 percent too.

Having said that, one may appreciate that the government is not making silly mistakes, as a few previous regimes did.

But the question is for how long, as the patience of the powers that be is said to be wearing thin and stabilisation fatigue is seeping in. And the only thing that can change this is tax reform.

Let’s see what the government has in its kitty today to positively surprise us in the budget speech.

Let’s hope against hope.

The delay has increased public interest across the country, especially among salaried individuals, pensioners, businesses and low-income households who are expecting significant relief.

For ordinary citizens, the federal budget is a document that directly affects daily life. It determines how much tax people will pay, what subsidies they may receive, and how much will be spent on basic services such as health, education, transport and development. Every year, the public waits for the budget because its decisions influence household expenses, food prices, electricity bills, job opportunities and the overall economic stability. This year, expectations are particularly high as families continue to deal with the financial pressure, despite some signs of economic recovery.

According to the National Economic Council (NEC) approved macroeconomic framework for the Federal Budget 2026-27, the government has set a total budget outlay of around Rs17.1 trillion. This reflects the overall size of federal spending, including debt servicing, defence, development programmes and administrative costs. Within this broader framework, development planning has also been structured to support medium-term growth and stability.

The NEC has also approved a GDP growth target of 4% for the upcoming fiscal year. This indicates a cautious but positive expectation of economic recovery. The target suggests that the government is aiming for gradual expansion in industrial output, agriculture performance and services sector growth. However, achieving this target will depend on the global economic conditions, domestic stability and the success of policy measures introduced in the budget.

Inflation remains a key concern for the policymakers and citizens alike. The NEC framework sets an inflation target of around 8.2%, reflecting an attempt to keep price increases within a manageable single-digit range. While this represents an improvement, compared with the high inflation levels seen in previous years, it still means that the prices of essential goods and services are expected to rise, albeit at a slower pace. For ordinary households, even moderate inflation continues to put pressure on monthly budgets.

The fiscal position remains tight. The approved framework indicates a fiscal deficit target of around 5% to 5.5% of GDP. This means that the government is still expected to spend more than its total revenue, relying on borrowing and other financing sources to bridge the gap. While this level of deficit is seen as relatively controlled under the current conditions, it still reflects the challenges of balancing development needs with fiscal discipline.

For salaried individuals, the most important question is whether this budget will bring real financial relief. Over the past few years, inflation has significantly reduced the purchasing power, making it increasingly difficult for the middle-income families to manage expenses. Many salaried people are expecting revisions in income tax slabs, an increase in the minimum taxable income threshold, or reductions in tax rates for the middle-income groups. If such measures are introduced, they could allow households to retain more of their income, improving consumption and overall economic activity.

Government employees and pensioners are also closely watching the budget. Fixed incomes have been heavily affected by rising prices of food, transport and utilities. There is widespread expectation that the salaries and pensions may be adjusted to reflect inflation trends. Even a moderate increase would provide relief to millions of families struggling to meet basic needs such as healthcare, education and daily household expenses. However, the government must carefully balance such adjustments with its limited fiscal space.

The low-income households remain the most vulnerable segment of society. For many families, basic items such as flour, cooking oil, electricity and rent consume the majority of their income. In this context, expectations are high for expanded social protection programmes.

Strengthening cash transfer schemes, food subsidies and targeted welfare initiatives could help reduce poverty and provide support to those most affected by the economic hardships. These programmes are particularly important in rural areas and densely populated urban settlements where unemployment and informal work are widespread.

Investors and entrepreneurs have long argued that Pakistan needs a more stable and predictable tax environment to encourage growth. Businesses are hoping for reduced tax burdens, simplified regulations and stronger incentives for investment.

If the government introduces supportive measures for industry, exports and small and medium enterprises, it could lead to job creation and increased economic activity. This would not only benefit investors but also improve employment opportunities for the young people entering the workforce.

Another important area of focus is public sector development and service delivery. Citizens continue to express concerns about the quality of healthcare facilities, overcrowded schools and inadequate infrastructure. Increased allocations for education, health and development projects could help address these longstanding issues. Better schools would improve literacy and skills development, while improved healthcare systems would ensure wider access to medical services. Investments in roads, water supply systems and urban infrastructure would also improve daily life and support economic growth.

Agriculture remains the backbone of Pakistan’s economy, employing a large portion of the workforce. Farmers are currently facing rising input costs, climate-related challenges and unstable market prices. The budget is expected to include measures such as fertiliser subsidies, improved irrigation systems and better access to agricultural credit. Strengthening the agriculture sector would not only increase rural incomes but also help stabilise food prices across the country, benefiting consumers in both urban and rural areas.

The information technology sector is another area with strong growth potential. Pakistan’s IT industry has expanded rapidly in recent years, driven by freelancers, software developers and export-oriented companies. There is growing expectation that the budget will introduce incentives for IT startups, digital infrastructure and technology exports. Supporting this sector could generate high-skilled employment, increase foreign exchange earnings and reduce reliance on traditional industries.

There are also concerns about possible challenges in the budget. The government is under pressure to meet revenue targets, while also managing heavy debt repayments. This may lead to the introduction of new taxes or the expansion of existing ones. While direct taxes generally affect higher-income groups, indirect taxes can impact all the consumers by increasing the prices of goods and services. This remains a major concern for households already struggling with the rising living costs.

Energy prices are another sensitive issue. Electricity, gas and fuel costs continue to be a major burden for both households and businesses. There is a possibility that subsidies may be reduced further to improve fiscal stability and meet financial targets. While such measures may strengthen the economy in the long-term, they can increase short-term financial pressure on citizens. Higher energy costs also affect transportation and production, which can lead to increased prices of everyday goods.

Many citizens are hoping for significant relief through tax cuts, salary increases and expanded welfare programmes. However, given the fiscal deficit target of 5% to 5.5% of GDP and the overall budget constraints, the government may not be able to meet all the expectations.

If the final measures fall short of public hopes, disappointment may follow, even if some improvements are delivered.

Inflation, although lower than previous peaks, remains a key concern. The target of 8.2% indicates moderation, but prices are still expected to rise. If government spending increases without careful control, there is always a risk of renewed inflationary pressure. For ordinary citizens, price stability is often more important than headline economic figures. Even small increases in food or utility costs can significantly affect the household budgets.

Small and medium enterprises also face serious challenges. These businesses are important for employment generation and economic activity but often struggle with taxation, compliance costs and access to finance. Without targeted support, many SMEs may find it difficult to expand or even sustain operations. Supporting this sector is necessary for inclusive growth and long-term economic stability.

The government, therefore, faces a difficult balancing act. On the one hand, it must provide relief to the citizens who have endured years of financial hardships, and on the other, it must maintain fiscal discipline goals.

The success of the Federal Budget 2026-27 will depend not only on its numerical targets but on its real impact on ordinary citizens. If it succeeds in reducing financial pressure, improving public services and supporting job creation, it will be seen as a positive step forward. However, if rising costs continue to outweigh the benefits of policy measures, public frustration may persist.

The writer is a seasoned journalist and a communications professional.

Diplomatic relationships have been strained. International organisations have warned that higher energy and transport costs could worsen food insecurity across vulnerable regions. Yet another question is now beginning to emerge in financial markets. Could this conflict also be interfering with the very interest-rate cycle that helped fuel the artificial-intelligence boom?

At first glance, the connection appears tenuous. One concerns geopolitics and energy markets.

The other concerns technology, venture capital and equity valuations. Yet financial markets rarely separate developments as neatly as investors do.

Energy prices remain highly sensitive to developments around the Strait of Hormuz.

Although crude has retreated from its peaks whenever reports of diplomatic progress emerge, traders continue reacting sharply to headlines from the region.

Around a fifth of globally traded oil normally passes through the waterway, and even temporary disruptions can reverberate through inflation expectations, bond markets and central-bank thinking.

That matters because oil has a habit of leaking into every other price in the economy.

Higher fuel costs eventually influence freight, manufacturing, fertiliser, aviation and food.

Central banks can often look through short-term volatility. Sustained energy shocks are considerably harder to ignore.

Before the conflict, investors broadly anticipated a significantly easier monetary-policy path.

The debate centred largely on the pace of future rate cuts. Inflation appeared to be moderating. Financial conditions remained supportive.

The assumption underpinning much of the optimism in financial markets was that the era of aggressive monetary tightening was drawing to a close.

The Iran war complicated that outlook.

Bond yields have moved higher as markets reassess inflation risks and the possibility that central banks may need to remain restrictive for longer than previously expected. Rate-cut expectations have become less certain.

The discussion is no longer focused solely on how quickly policymakers can ease.

Investors are again debating how persistent inflationary pressures may prove to be if energy markets remain vulnerable to geopolitical shocks.

And that shift may ultimately matter more for technology valuations than any single earnings report.

The AI boom has depended on extraordinary optimism about future growth. Investors have been willing to value companies on earnings projections stretching many years into the future.

That process becomes more difficult when the cost of money rises. Higher interest rates reduce the present value of future cash flows.

They also increase the hurdle rate for the enormous sums now being committed to AI infrastructure.

The scale involved is remarkable. Major technology companies continue committing hundreds of billions of dollars to data centres, chips, energy infrastructure and AI development.

Analysts have projected trillions of dollars of cumulative AI-related investment over the coming decade.

At the same time, some of the most anticipated technology listings in the world are expected to command valuations measured in the trillions.

None of this proves that a bubble exists. Artificial intelligence may ultimately justify every dollar being invested in it. Productivity gains could exceed expectations.

Entire industries may be reshaped. Revenue growth may eventually validate today’s aggressive forecasts.

Yet has the market perhaps become accustomed to asking only one side of the question?

For years, economists, traders and academics have debated whether the AI boom contains elements of speculative excess. The disagreement was rarely about the technology itself.

The real argument concerned valuation, expectations and timing. If enthusiasm eventually outran reality, what would expose it? What event could force investors to revisit assumptions that had become deeply embedded in market pricing?

Few would have pointed to a conflict in the Middle East.

Yet an energy shock that alters the interest-rate outlook can eventually reshape the pricing of assets that appear entirely unrelated to oil.

A disruption in one corner of the global economy often exposes vulnerabilities elsewhere.

Markets that were comfortable with pricing years of future growth under one set of monetary assumptions may suddenly find themselves operating under another.

Recent market behaviour suggests investors are at least beginning to grapple with that possibility.

Technology shares have become noticeably more sensitive to interest-rate expectations. Bond-market moves increasingly command as much attention as corporate earnings announcements.

Strong economic data that might once have been welcomed now sometimes triggers concern because it reduces the likelihood of near-term monetary easing.

Could that be the signal worth watching?

Perhaps the AI rally resumes its ascent, and this latest scare fades into memory. Perhaps diplomacy succeeds, oil prices stabilise, and inflation pressures ease.

Perhaps central banks regain the flexibility investors expected at the start of the year.

But if the Iran war has already exposed vulnerabilities in supply chains, energy markets, diplomatic relationships and inflation expectations, is it unreasonable to ask whether it may also have disturbed the foundations supporting the market’s most crowded trade?

That may ultimately be the most ironic consequence of all. A war launched for geopolitical reasons could end up influencing the financial conditions that helped sustain one of the greatest investment booms of the modern era.

The question is whether markets are witnessing a temporary interruption to the AI story, or the beginning of a broader reassessment of the assumptions that made the story possible in the first place.

When the United States and Israel launched their joint strikes on Iran on February 28, the prevailing assumption in Washington and Tel Aviv was straightforward: a swift, decisive campaign to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme, degrade its military capacity, and restore the old order in the Middle East — one in which Iran knew its place. One hundred days later, that assumption lies in ruins. Iran has not been broken. It has, paradoxically, been elevated.

The Islamic Republic that was once regarded as a declining, sanctioned, internally fractured state has emerged from this war as the most consequential power in the region — not despite the American and Israeli assault, but partly because of it.

A reluctant superpower

A year ago, the idea of Iran directly and repeatedly striking Israeli territory would have seemed far-fetched. The calculus was simple: Iran’s deterrence rested on proxies — Hezbollah, the Houthis, various Iraqi militias. Direct confrontation with Israel, let alone a nuclear-armed one backed by the United States, was considered suicidal.

That calculus has been shattered.

Iran launched ballistic missiles at central and southern Israel this week, triggering Israeli air defences, after Israel renewed strikes on southern Lebanon in what Tehran said was a violation of the ceasefire. Israel retaliated by targeting a petrochemical plant inside Iran. The two countries are now trading strikes with a regularity that would have been unimaginable twelve months ago — and Iran is doing so without existential panic. It is calibrating, warning, and withdrawing on its own terms.

This is not the behaviour of a defeated state. This is the behaviour of a regional power that has learned, under fire, that it can absorb punishment and survive.

Trump’s uncomfortable position

Perhaps the most telling indicator of Iran’s new leverage is the posture of Donald Trump himself.

Trump called on Israel and Iran to “immediately stop shooting” on Monday, posting on Truth Social: “Both sides, Israel and Iran, are looking to do an immediate ceasefire!” The language is telling. This is not a commander dictating terms to an adversary. This is a president pleading for restraint — from both sides equally, including from his own closest regional ally.

Trump told Axios that Iran had contacted him directly, saying they would stop shooting if Israel backed off. “They called us and said that they are not doing any more attacks and asked us to tell Israel not to do any more attacks,” Trump said. Think about what that means. Iran is now giving Washington instructions on how to manage Israel.

This is a remarkable inversion of the regional order. The US, which launched this war, is now acting more as a mediator than a belligerent. And Iran is exploiting every inch of that space.

The art of the stall

Iran has also proved itself a shrewd negotiator — or, more precisely, a masterful procrastinator.

According to Axios, US and Iranian negotiators reached an agreement on the terms of a deal in Doha, but Trump did not immediately sign off.

“The president relayed to the mediators that he wants a couple of days to think about it,” a US official said.

Meanwhile, a senior Arab official involved in the mediation told NBC News the delays were “frustrating,” describing the situation as “everyone playing a game of chicken and egg.”

Tehran has good reason to drag its feet. Every week that passes without a deal is a week in which Iran consolidates its new status.

Every Israeli strike on Lebanon that Iran responds to is a demonstration that it can project power and defend its allies. And every time Trump publicly frets about the pace of talks, Iran’s hand strengthens.

Trump has sent decidedly mixed messages. On Monday, he said he “couldn’t care less” if negotiations collapsed, only to post on Truth Social hours later that talks were “continuing, at a rapid pace.” The vacillation has not gone unnoticed in Tehran.

The midterm clock

Iran understands something that its adversaries are reluctant to admit publicly: Donald Trump is fighting on two fronts. One is in the Middle East. The other is domestic.

The 2026 midterm elections loom, and a war with no end in sight is politically toxic. Trump staked his reputation on being the president who ends wars, not the one who starts them. The Iran conflict, now at 100 days, is already longer than he anticipated. As one Washington Post opinion piece noted, Trump “desperately needs” a peace deal, and his short attention span “constantly bungles his political aspirations.”

Iran, by contrast, is not running for anything. The supreme leader does not face a midterm election. Tehran can afford patience in ways that Washington simply cannot.

The limits of air power

There is a deeper lesson here that the architects of this campaign should reckon with honestly. Air power can destroy infrastructure. It can kill military commanders. It can set back a nuclear programme by months or years. What it cannot do — as Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria have all demonstrated at enormous cost — is reshape a country’s political identity or eliminate its will to resist.

Iran in 2026 is proof of this once again. The strikes have not produced a compliant Tehran. They have produced a more confident one.

A new Middle East

The region that emerges from this war, whatever the final diplomatic settlement, will not resemble the one that existed before February 28. Iran has demonstrated that it can absorb a US-Israeli military campaign, maintain its alliances, strike its enemies directly, and negotiate from a position of strength.

That is the definition of a regional power. Not the Iran of a year ago — sanctioned, isolated, and quietly declining. But an Iran that the Middle East and Washington will have to accommodate for years to come.

The war meant to cut Iran down to size may well have done the opposite.

The writer is a seasoned journalist covering the economy and international affairs.

The budget, expected to be announced this Friday, will, therefore, have few surprises for two reasons: (i) the third review of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the second review of the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) documents were uploaded on the Fund website on 15 May – two days after the arrival of the mission to review the budget – detailing time-bound conditions and structural benchmarks agreed with the authorities till the next mandatory quarterly review scheduled for 15 September. The envisaged disbursement, subject to reaching a staff level agreement, is 760 million SDRs under the EFF and 76.9 million SDRs under the RSF; and (ii) budget formulators typically disclaim responsibility for almost 75 to 80 per cent of the budgeted allocations on the grounds that they are taken by the elite/influentials and, when the country is on a Fund programme, by the IMF.

The annual raise in total budgeted outlay is premised on a very optimistic projection of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate. Post-Covid 19, with the exception of 2021-22, the growth rate has been well below projections, given that the country has been on a rigid upfront IMF programme since 2019, this has implied slashing the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) to meet the deficit targets agreed with the Fund. Sadly, this has been the practice during nearly all the Fund programmes. Pakistan is currently on the twenty-fourth programme, yet, over time, as was to be expected, the PSDP actual disbursement has been shrinking in terms of the percentage budgeted allocation – the July-April 2026 rate is at a low of 51 per cent.

The misalignment between the PSDP authorisations (by the Planning Ministry) and the actual disbursement (by the Finance Ministry) may indicate: (i) the Planning Ministry distancing itself from the lower disbursements than budgeted (though it is the Ministry’s responsibility to present more realistic allocations, given the shrinking fiscal space); and/or (ii) it may be an attempt to showcase the failure of the Finance Ministry to fund development and instead to continue to prioritise the outlay for current expenditure.

The focus has remained on ensuring that the current expenditure requirements are met.

The major component of this is the mark-up on loans budgeted at a little over 50 per cent of the total current expenditure in 2025-26 – an outlay which, if not released, would have serious economic consequences. This is lower than what was realised in 2024-25 – at 54.5 per cent – though it was budgeted at 56.8 per cent of total current expenditure, with the difference in total terms being 813 billion rupees.

The lower outlay for mark-up this year was not due to lower envisaged borrowing but lower borrowing costs – rescheduling past loans, which lengthened the period but lowered the actual interest payment and the anticipation of a lower policy rate by December last year (a rate that had to be raised due to the Middle East conflict – so much for its effects remaining contained).

In this context, it is relevant to note that the 1.25 trillion rupees borrowed from the 16 commercial banks to retire the circular debt was, after IMF approval, not included in the mark-up and defined as a one-off.

In total terms, the budgeted mark-up in 2024-25 was higher by 829,666 billion rupees than what was realised at the end of the year due to a lower policy rate over the year as well as rescheduling.

The budget documents for the next fiscal year, 2026-27, would indicate by how much this expenditure item exceeded the budgeted amount.

Defence as a percentage of current expenditure was 15.62 per cent of total current expenditure 2025-26, while last year it was at 13.3 per cent (with the budgeted amount under this head lower by 2.3 per cent).

The rise may well be due to higher operational costs due to ongoing terror attacks; however, it is relevant to restate that the actual current expenditure as per budget documents for last year declined by 813 billion rupees.

Running civilian government rose to 5.9 per cent of total current expenditure in the current year’s budget against 5.4 per cent in last year’s revised estimates due to massive pay rises at the taxpayers’ expense.

Pensions rose from 1.014 trillion rupees in the revised estimates of last year to 1.055 trillion rupees this year, money dedicated for public sector pensioners and does not include the 93 per cent of those who are engaged in the private sector.

While the government has made employee contributions mandatory since last year, greater clarity is required as to whether this amount is being set up in an escrow account or a pension fund, or whether the money is being fungible, the government is using it for meeting its expenses, which may have some consequences down the line.

Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) received less than 5 per cent of the current outlay as per the Fund’s insistence, though the beneficiaries that have been identified through a scientific method of selection do not constitute the rising number of unemployed as a consequence of the Fund’s severely contractionary monetary and fiscal policies, nor take cognisance of the rising poverty levels through the calorific method.

Revenue is to be generated from (i) raising indirect taxes (sales tax in particular) with the rationale that the GST C-efficiency ratio (actual revenue collection from goods and services to potential) has declined from 27.4 per cent to 22.8 per cent over the past ten years.

The Fund proposes taxing a broad set of basic goods that remain exempt or are concessionally taxed, historical zero-rating in export sectors has narrowed the base, and post-devolution fragmentation of GST on services has added compliance and administrative complexity through four separate provincial regimes; however, these are indirect taxes whose incidence on the poor is greater than on the rich, (ii) constitutional court ruled in favour of super tax; however, there is a concern that capital flight may be further fuelled; and (iii) increasing provincial taxes and most particularly agricultural income tax that must be taxed at the same rate as on the salaried. If implemented, this will have political ramifications.

An out-of-the-box solution would be for the government to implement reforms in pensions (through employee contributions that would then be channelled into existing pensioners), a wage freeze for the next three years, budgeting only critical operational expenses, and realistic targets for the mark-up while focusing on creating honest taxpayers through implementing a tax structure that is fair, equitable and non-anomalous.

As is customary, the budget speech will be wrapped in polished language and a labyrinth of figures, percentages, projections, and economic terminology.

It will be watched anxiously across the length and breadth of Pakistan by business chambers, investors, and ordinary citizens alike—the latter holding their breath in the faint hope that it may bring some relief rather than descend like a fresh bombshell of inflation and economic hardship.

For years, the people have endured an unending cycle of mini-budgets in the form of abrupt increases in petroleum prices, electricity and gas tariffs, and fertiliser costs.

These mini budgets trigger a wave of inflation, causing a chain reaction that sends the prices of essential commodities soaring, while rarely, if ever, bringing them back down.

Each increase adds another burden to the shoulders of millions already struggling to survive, tightening the noose around households battling shrinking incomes and rising costs of living.

As one walks through bazaars and markets, one finds little evidence of the much-trumpeted economic recovery.

Under blistering temperatures approaching 50°C and amid frequent, prolonged power outages, people desperately haggle over prices they can scarcely afford.

The reality on the ground tells a different story from the optimistic narratives often heard in official circles.

One encounters village women in bazaars and markets in worn-out clothes carrying malnourished children in their laps, with barefoot youngsters trailing behind.

They move from stall to stall, gazing at vegetables, flour, and other necessities, only to return to their huts empty-handed. This heartbreaking scene is not confined to one locality.

It is the bitter reality visible across cities, towns, and villages throughout Pakistan.

“Does this budget have anything for us?” ask the multitudes struggling merely to survive.

Their question deserves an honest answer.

A large portion of government revenues is consumed by debt servicing, defence expenditures, administrative costs, salaries, and pensions.

What remains for education, health, development, infrastructure, and social welfare is often little more than crumbs.

Even these scarce resources frequently disappear under the insidious shadow of corruption, leaving little to improve the lives of ordinary citizens.

Can a nation claim economic stability when nearly half its population struggles below or near the poverty line? Can recovery be celebrated when millions face hunger and deprivation? Pakistan continues to grapple with one of the region’s lowest literacy rates.

More than 25 million children remain out of school. Healthcare services are deteriorating.

Parents are withdrawing children from classrooms because they can no longer afford educational expenses.

Despair is driving many young people into depression, addiction, crime, and even suicide.

Millions face acute food insecurity. Unemployment remains alarmingly high, while vast numbers of young people enter an already saturated job market every year.

Thousands seek opportunities abroad in desperation, while countless others remain trapped in hopelessness at home. Does this reflect genuine recovery, or merely statistical recovery disconnected from lived reality?

This august House must reflect upon these painful realities. Parliament is not merely a forum where budget figures are recited and financial statements approved.

It is the supreme representative institution of the sovereign people. It must safeguard the people’s right to live with dignity, to earn a livelihood, to educate their children, and to hope for a better future.

The roots of our economic difficulties are well known: a narrow tax base, elite tax evasion, low exports, excessive imports, chronic trade imbalances, dependence on foreign borrowing, and recurring IMF conditionalities.

Yet the burden of adjustment repeatedly falls upon those least able to bear it—the ordinary citizens already gasping for economic breath.

This budget, therefore, demands sacrifice from the top, the elite and the privileged class rather than further extraction from the bottom.

Real reform requires reducing the size of government, curtailing excessive perks and privileges, eliminating redundant ministries and departments, abolishing unnecessary SAPMs and advisors, discontinuing the pensionary benefits to former Presidents, PMs and Speakers forthwith, rationalising expenditures, and ensuring that public office remains a responsibility rather than a source of privilege.

The nation cannot continue asking the poor to tighten their belts while the corridors of power remain insulated from sacrifice.

Parliament, which often demonstrates remarkable unity when protecting its own privileges, must now display the same unity in protecting the interests of the people and reclaiming Pakistan’s economic sovereignty.

An indebted nation is not a free nation. Excessive dependence on external lenders gradually erodes national autonomy and limits independent policymaking.

The path forward lies in domestic resource mobilisation, expansion of the tax net, export-led growth, agricultural revival, industrial development, investment in human capital, and uncompromising accountability.

Only through such measures can Pakistan reduce its dependence on debt and move towards genuine financial self-reliance and economic autarky.

Above all, this budget must be a budget for the people.

As lawmakers deliberate beneath the high ceilings of Parliament today, they should think beyond spreadsheets and statistics.

They should think of the barefoot children wandering through bazaars, of mothers bargaining desperately for necessities, of farmers crushed by rising costs, and of young people losing hope on street corners.

Let this Parliament rise above partisan divisions and prove worthy of the trust placed in it by the sovereign people.

Let it deliver a budget that alleviates poverty, creates employment, strengthens education and healthcare, restores human dignity, and places public welfare at the centre of national priorities.

Only then will the budget be remembered not as an annual ritual of accounting, but as a genuine instrument of justice, compassion, and national renewal.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

For years, markets tolerated massive deficits, ultra-cheap money and endless promises that debt no longer mattered. Now the old enforcers of fiscal discipline appear to be returning.

The bond vigilantes are riding again.

The term emerged in the 1980s to describe investors who punished governments they viewed as fiscally reckless by demanding sharply higher yields to hold sovereign debt. It sounds theatrical, almost like a phrase from an old financial Western, yet the mechanism is brutally simple. If investors lose confidence in a government’s ability to control spending or inflation, borrowing costs rise. And when borrowing costs rise long enough, political problems eventually follow.

Britain already knows how ugly that process can become. Liz Truss lasted just weeks after bond markets revolted against unfunded tax cuts in 2022. Now gilt investors are once again flexing their muscles as political uncertainty around Keir Starmer collides with renewed inflation fears triggered by the US-Israeli war on Iran. Bond traders are no longer merely reacting to economic data. They are openly evaluating which politicians appear “market-friendly” and which ones threaten even larger deficits.

One almost wonders whether elections are slowly becoming secondary to bond-market approval ratings.

The timing is hardly accidental. Governments across the developed world are trapped between rising spending obligations and weakening fiscal flexibility. Defence budgets are climbing, ageing populations are becoming more expensive to support, and debt burdens remain historically high after the pandemic years. Then came another energy shock. Oil prices surged after the conflict around Iran disrupted flows through the Strait of Hormuz, reviving precisely the kind of inflation anxiety central banks hoped they had left behind in 2022.

That is where the story becomes more dangerous. Bond markets were already uneasy before the war. The oil shock merely accelerated existing cracks. Higher energy prices push up inflation expectations, which in turn force investors to demand higher yields as compensation for holding long-term debt. The result is a vicious cycle for governments already drowning in borrowing requirements. Debt servicing costs rise just as policymakers face pressure to spend even more.

And perhaps that raises the more uncomfortable question. Has Donald Trump’s war on Iran triggered yet another fault line in a global financial system that was already struggling to absorb higher rates and larger deficits? The energy shock itself may eventually fade, but bond markets appear increasingly focused on the longer-term consequences: structurally higher borrowing costs in economies addicted to debt-financed stability.

The reaction is visible well beyond Britain. Japanese bond markets are again under pressure as investors worry about borrowing-led spending plans, and the yen weakens under the strain of higher energy imports. In the United States, Treasury yields remain materially above pre-war levels even as equity markets repeatedly attempt to price in optimism around diplomacy and eventual rate cuts. France continues battling political instability while facing investor concerns over deficits. Even parts of Asia are feeling the squeeze as currencies weaken and central banks intervene to defend exchange rates against rising energy-import costs.

For years, central banks acted as shock absorbers by suppressing yields through massive bond-buying programmes. Investors knew there was always a buyer standing behind the market. That era is fading. Central banks are retreating from extraordinary stimulus while inflation risks remain stubbornly alive. Bond investors, therefore, carry far greater influence than they did during the years of cheap money. Markets that once depended on central-bank protection are now rediscovering the price of fiscal credibility.

There is another layer to this story that should worry policymakers. Financial risk has not disappeared during the era of low rates; it has simply migrated. A growing share of government-bond trading now flows through hedge funds and leveraged financial structures rather than traditional banks. Private credit markets have exploded in size. Regulators spent years strengthening banks after the 2008 crisis, only for leverage to reappear elsewhere in the system. That means sudden moves in yields now carry the potential to trigger stress across a far wider range of institutions.

Markets have already offered glimpses of that danger. Hedge funds suffered sharp losses during the initial oil shock following the Iran conflict as yields surged and rate expectations rapidly repriced. So far, the system has absorbed the stress reasonably well. There has been no broad liquidation panic, no repeat of the violent bond dislocations seen during earlier crises. Yet the question remains hanging over markets like an unwanted shadow. What happens if the next round of stress hits equities, credit markets and sovereign bonds simultaneously?

For countries like Pakistan, the implications extend well beyond financial theory. Higher US Treasury yields tighten financial conditions globally, strengthen the dollar and increase pressure on emerging-market borrowing costs. Oil shocks simultaneously worsen import bills and inflation pressures. Countries already balancing fragile external accounts quickly discover how little room remains for policy mistakes once bond markets turn hostile. The world’s largest economies may still possess buffers that smaller states do not.

That may ultimately be the real significance of the bond vigilantes’ return. Investors are no longer reacting only to inflation data or central-bank speeches. They are beginning to question whether governments themselves have become structurally dependent on debt, cheap refinancing and endless fiscal expansion. Wars, energy shocks and political instability merely accelerate the moment when those doubts become impossible to ignore.

Bond markets, in the end, have a habit of forcing reality back into systems built on optimistic assumptions. The question now is whether governments are facing a temporary period of market anxiety, or the early stages of a much harsher repricing of fiscal risk in a world already strained by war, debt and inflation fatigue.

“I disagree — he is following the US policy to snip all anti-Semitism in the bud even though it lost him the Muslim vote.”

“But that’s silly. The British public is angered at Israeli genocide of Gaza now into its third year, its support for the settlers ransacking and killing Palestinians in the West Bank, its attacks on Lebanon, its ceasefire violations that number more than a 1000 I reckon….”

“That fellow Mehmud Abbas….”

“Hey should at least have the courage to admit the flaw in his policy of engagement with Israel.”

“Bush’s legacy is truly gone – from referring to those opposed to Israeli hegemonistic designs in the region as the axis of evil, to now being referred to as the axis of resistance.”

“Hamm but what should or could Starmer learn from us?”

“Let me give you a hint, our Prime Minister has reportedly ordered the Board of Investment (BOI) to merge with the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) and…..why are you frowning?”

“Foreign direct investment has fallen dramatically – from 1.5 billion dollars July-March last year, no great shakes in any case if we consider that India attracted more than 50 billion dollars last year, to 410.7 million dollars in the same period this year….”

“The merger….”

“SIFC was established in June 2023 and BOI dates back to God knows how many decades!”

“OH, so you want the BOI to be dissolved, I guess. But what about the man who heads it – Aleem Khan.

First, you took away his control over the Ministry of Privatisation, remember the PIA privatisation fiasco, which he said he was not involved in, that he still heads by the way, and now BoI.”

“He still has Communications, though I am not sure what that entails other than a flagged car and protocol. But I tell you this shows that dumping of The Man Who Must Remain Nameless, Faceless and Voiceless is no longer…”

“Shut up. Anyway, Wes Streeting is, or perhaps more accurately, may make a run for his boss’s job. Now if Starmer were the Pakistani Prime Minister, he would have merged the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, Streeting’s portfolio, with that of the Prime Minister, and so the guy would be without a job.”

“I heard that the Prime Minister has some differences with the Minister for Interior? Can he merge…”

“Stop right there.”

“OK, but I am not sure if there is a tradition of wearing multiple hats in the UK?”

“Starmer is trying to change tradition: you gotta give him that! So why not in this too?”

“I can’t argue with that.”

The challenges are rising because of the current commodity price shock, mainly energy.

Regional currencies, including India’s, have been adjusting to changing realities. However, Pakistani authorities, as always, remain sensitive about exchange rate adjustment. It appears there are no lessons from the past.

PKR has appreciated by a few percentage points against the USD over the past three years. The rupee depreciation was sharp in the year before that, and the adjustment was higher than what inflation and interest rate differentials suggested, which was evident from the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) value of 85-87 in the first half of 2023.

The next two years were a catching-up period. SBP kept real interest rates positive, and inflation cooled amid declining international commodity prices after the supercycle. However, lately, with a recent inflation surge due to the global oil price shock, the exchange rate again appears overvalued. REER moved up to 105.2 in March 2026, the highest level since September 2018.

It needs gradual adjustment. Otherwise, within a few months or quarters, the currency could depreciate with a sharp jerk. That is not healthy and could create panic. It is better to make timely adjustments, which would help restore competitiveness. Some may argue that exports do not grow merely because of currency depreciation. That is partially correct, but an overvalued currency reduces the existing export base and makes imports cheaper, thereby putting pressure on the trade deficit.

Over the last three years, on a 12-month rolling basis, inward remittances have increased by $13 billion, or almost 50 per cent, to reach $40 billion. That has helped contain the current account deficit, even as the trade balance worsened by $12 billion during the same period.

Now, a dent in remittances is expected due to a slowdown in GCC economies in the aftermath of the US-Iran war, from where Pakistan receives 50 per cent of its inward flows. This, coupled with upward pressure on imports due to higher prices, would strain the current account balance. That, in turn, would limit SBP’s ability to build forex reserves.

To curb imported demand, SBP has increased the policy rate by 1 per cent and may announce another hike in June, as inflation is expected to remain around 13-15 per cent in May and June. It is advisable to use the exchange rate as a line of defence, which would also help exports remain steady. Remittances are not very currency-sensitive, but exports are.

Pakistan’s textile exports have two segments. One is low-value-added yarn and fabric, whose share is falling and being replaced by the growing high-value-added segment of garments and apparel. That is positive, but the growing segment is losing competitiveness. According to leading textile exporter Musadaq Zulqarnain, 20-25 per cent of costs consist of wages, which have increased by over 30 per cent in dollar terms over the last three years, as minimum wages in PKR terms have risen by 25 per cent in two years. This has resulted in a 5-6 per cent reduction in margins in an industry where margins are already thin.

The increase in wages was necessary to counter inflation, but at the same time, PKR should be adjusted to keep exporters’ margins intact. A similar situation exists for IT exporters, where labour accounts for 70-80 per cent of costs. They are facing pressure as well. One player argues that there should be a defined exchange rate policy linked to a certain REER level.

Treasury officers in leading banks also believe that PKR needs adjustment, but according to one banker, SBP is too touchy about changing currency parity. Well, SBP, or authorities in the twin cities, should not get married to a particular level.

The SBP governor recently said that the central bank bought $27 billion from the interbank market over the last three and a half years. He perhaps implied that had SBP not bought these dollars, the currency could have appreciated further. That may not be entirely true. The current account has cumulatively shown a mere $0.3 billion surplus since January 2023, while SBP reserves, net of external debt and liabilities, have risen by only $3.3 billion. (SBP forex reserves increased by $13.3 billion, while total external debt and liabilities rose by $10 billion during the same period.) If we also add the $3 billion reduction in forward liabilities, overall net reserves, adjusted for forward liabilities, increased by $6.3 billion.

This means that around $20 billion out of SBP’s $27 billion purchases was effectively used to finance the current account, as SBP pays interest on government debt, which forms part of the current account. Moreover, SBP has an unstated rule requiring banks not to buy dollars from one another and instead to finance outflows through their own inflows. Any surplus dollars are then absorbed by SBP.

That strategy may not work going forward, as the current account could slip into deficit in FY27, halting reserve accumulation. It is best to act before panic hits in the coming months or quarters.

The doctor’s prescription is a gradual depreciation of 3-5 per cent, implemented in a well-communicated manner to avoid panic, restore competitiveness, and prevent a far more disruptive adjustment later.

The consequence? An economy unable to fund its investment needs has to rely on foreign savings, resulting in a balance of payments crisis each time. This is not a tale of saving money or living frugally.

This is one of the most important, but also the least discussed, macroeconomic disasters of our time. It needs attention in the upcoming budget debate for FY2026-27.

The country cannot finance sustainable growth by taxing more and borrowing more; it needs to rebuild its domestic savings base for sustainable growth.

The current performance of country savings looks very dismal when compared with the regional peers. Pakistan has been saving on average about 11 percent of its GDP for the past 35 years.

In the same period, Bangladesh averaged 21 percent, India by over 28 percent, and Vietnam by almost 30 percent.

The gap cannot be explained by income level alone; these countries managed to create an environment where savings were safe and well-rewarded. Those savings ultimately translated into jobs and growth.

Conversely, the savings base eroded in Pakistan. Because savings don’t make sense for the average Pakistani. Around 94 percent of all income generated in the economy is consumed on necessities, such as food, rent, power, commuting, healthcare, and education.

Whatever little money is left over gets eaten up by rising inflation, which in recent years has always risen faster than the interest offered by banks.

When returns on deposits or savings products do not compensate for rising prices, households see little reason to keep money in formal financial instruments.

This creates an inflation/consumption trap. Households spend the lion’s share on necessities, and what little is left ends up stashed in cash, committees, and jewellery in the cupboard.

These may provide security at the household level, but they do not create an efficient pool of resources for productive investment.

The situation is further worsened by the lack of financial literacy and sludge.

Millions of Pakistanis, particularly women and rural inhabitants, are unable to access financial instruments due to long distances, extensive documentation, lack of trust, and existing products that are not compatible with their needs and beliefs.

Then comes the role of the state, persistent fiscal deficits reduced national savings due to persistent fiscal deficits.

Over the years, the country has been spending more than it generates and relies heavily on borrowing, including from domestic banks, leaving almost nothing for the private sector.

Banks prefer such lending due to associated lower risks and higher profits, which triggers the crowding out of private investors from the economy.

However, all is not lost, and this issue is still resolvable. The upcoming Finance Bill is the natural place to begin with, through the provision of incentives to motivate citizens and nudging them to save.

Building on the Policy Viewpoint, “Mobilising Domestic Savings: A Finance Bill and Institutional Reform Agenda for Pakistan,” by Dr S. M. Naeem Nawaz (Professor of Economics) and Wajid Islam (Research Economist) at PIDE, the policy response should begin with a targeted National Savings Mobilisation Package through the FY2026–27 Finance Bill.

The principle should be simple. Ensure that systematic saving is more rewarding and secure than stashing away one’s wealth in the form of cash or gold. Specifically, it requires the revival of a targeted tax relief scheme for approved long-term investment instruments.

Previously, such instruments were offered under Section 62 of the Income Tax Ordinance until withdrawn in 2022.

It implies the promotion of pension schemes, especially those aimed at younger individuals, women, and self-employed citizens, to encourage saving from an early age.

It is pertinent to note that the incentives have to be tailored to serve as a reward for authentic, small, and long-term savers.

Caps on the amount of the incentive, minimum investment duration, and clawback provisions for early withdrawals can help keep the fiscal burden at bay.

A savings-friendly budget needs to refrain from punishing citizens whenever their money flows into the formal economy.

The transaction taxes on bank-based financial transactions have done significant harm by pushing citizens away from banks.

Along with incentives, a conducive environment is a prerequisite to enable easy access to financial markets.

The country doesn’t need to work from scratch as several options are already available, such as national savings institutions, a broad network of banking outlets, digital payment mechanisms, and Islamic finance institutions.

What is needed is a channel that links them in a manner that allows citizens to gain access to these services through digital accounts, easy verifications, and diversity of Shariah-compliant instruments.

However, nothing will stick unless the government balances out its books as well.

Restraining wasteful expenditure, reducing losses in state-owned enterprises, and using borrowed funds for investments instead of expenditures must become integral parts of any policy for savings.

Pakistan has spent too long trying to finance growth without building the savings base needed to sustain it. The choice is not between austerity and growth.

The real choice is whether Pakistan will continue relying on foreign savings or begin rebuilding the domestic pool on which durable growth depends.

The Finance Bill FY2026-27 should be the starting point.

Reward formal long-term saving, protect small savers, reduce public-sector dissaving, and ensure that domestic resources finance productive investment.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

The objective was to derive the tax reform agenda from the viewpoint of raising the level of revenues, improving equity in the tax system and enhancing the efficiency in tax collection.

The coverage of taxes is taken to include the petroleum levy, a large source of revenue. This is not the case with the Federal Ministry of Finance, which treats it as non-tax revenue. However, it was taken out of the sales tax on POL products. The IMF also categorises the petroleum levy as a tax.

The principal problem continues to be very low revenue mobilisation by the provinces. Consequently, the national tax-to-GDP ratio remains relatively low at close to 12 percent of the GDP.

Other Asian countries have ratios ranging from 14 percent to 18 percent of the GDP.

Regarding tax rates, the evidence is that these rates are relatively high in Pakistan, and the focus of tax reforms should be on expanding the tax bases and bringing down rates, especially on the corporate sector, large-scale manufacturing and salary incomes.

The scope of widening the tax base exists in several sectors, including retail trade, real estate and agricultural incomes.

Based on the above description of the required type of tax reforms at the federal and provincial levels, some proposals are presented below.

The first important step is the rationalisation of the petroleum levy. Following the shift from sales tax to the levy, the effective rate has gone up substantially, from 18 percent to between 30 percent and 35 percent.

The incidence of petroleum taxes is regressive because they increase the transport cost of all products, including food items.

The rise in petrol prices after the commencement of the Middle East war has led to a quantum jump in the rate of inflation from 5 percent to 11 percent.

Therefore, there should be a reduction by at least one-third initially in the petroleum levy, which is currently Rs 117.4 per litre on petrol and Rs 42.6 on HSD. This major step in the federal budget will constitute a big source of relief.

The government has apparently decided to impose a small fixed 1 percent tax on small retailers. There is also a need for more revenue from large retailers and outlets in supermarkets.

As such, the withholding of income tax on commercial consumers on their electricity bills should be made more progressive.

Given the gross under-taxation of property today, in the presence of six taxes on property at the federal and provincial levels, there is a need to focus on real estate.

Today, investment is being diverted in a big way from industry to real estate.

The first proposal is the levy of a capital value tax on property at the federal level as a substitute for the wealth tax. This will also increase the progressivity of the tax system.

The exemption limit may be Rs 10 million. Beyond this, there could be four slabs with rates ranging from 0.25 percent to 1 percent.

There is also a case for the enhancement of withholding taxes on commercial importers, given the extremely low incidence of taxes on the wholesale and retail trade sector. The current rates should be enhanced by 0.5 to 1 percentage points.

Turning to the personal income tax, there is a strong case for raising the exemption limit from Rs 600,000 to Rs 1,200,000. Also, the size of the slabs needs to be increased, especially on salary income.

There is need also for rationalisation of the super tax on profits of corporate entities. Currently, it is linked on a progressive basis to the absolute size of profits.

This penalises corporate entities which are large in size but have low rates of return on equity.

The structure could start with a tax rate of profits of 25 percent if the return on equity is less than 12 percent. Thereafter, there could be three more slabs.

The highest slab should have a tax rate on profits of 35 percent when the pre-tax return on equity exceeds 25 percent.

There is a dire need for the development of the provincial tax system in Pakistan.

This has also been highlighted by the IMF. Consequently, the IMF has asked for additional revenue mobilisation of Rs 400 billion by the four provincial governments combined in 2026-27.

There are a number of potential sources of additional tax revenues at the provincial level.

The first large tax base is the agricultural income tax. If collected at the same rate as other personal income, it has the potential to yield Rs 800 billion in revenues.

The IMF has pushed for reform of the agricultural income tax law. This has been done by the provincial governments.

However, this has not translated into additional revenues. For example, the Punjab government has targeted only Rs 10.5 billion from this tax in 2025-26.

The agricultural income tax will also contribute to increased progressivity of the tax system. The top 1 percent of the farmers own over 24 percent of the farm area in Pakistan, according to the Agricultural Census.

However, the rural elite has a dominant role in the provincial power structure and has prevented a move towards normal taxation of agricultural income like other incomes.

The solution lies in the introduction of a simple, presumptive tax system with the tax rate linked to the size of the land holding.

The exemption limit could be 12.5 acres equivalent irrigated area. Therefore, there could be several slabs starting with a tax rate of Rs 1000 per acre, going up on landholdings above 150 acres to Rs 10,000 per acre.

The tax audit system of FBR needs to be improved.

First, the percentage of returns audited should exceed 10 percent. Second, a risk-based audit policy should be developed based on the characteristics of the taxpayer. Third, a new taxpayer may be exempted from audit for the first three years. Fourth, a taxpayer may not be subject to audit if the income disclosed increases by more than 25 percent.

There is also a need to introduce some fiscal incentives for promoting savings and investment, which have fallen to exceptionally low levels in Pakistan in recent years.

First, the investment allowance for investment in particular types of savings instruments may be reintroduced in the personal income tax. Second, the enhancement of the tax credit for balancing and modernization and replacement (BMR) is to be raised from 10 percent to 20 percent. Third, a tax holiday may be given for new investment in industry anywhere in Pakistan for five years.

Finally, there is an urgent need to focus on the process of integrating the provincial sales tax on services with the federal sales tax on goods. The first step should be the replacement of the federal excise duty on services by the provincial sales tax. Second, harmonisation of tax rates should take place to facilitate the move to a proper VAT.

This implies an increase in the provincial tax rates. Third, move towards administration and harmonisation with the same tax return, a common IT system and common rules. The powers of audit to be shared by the federal and provincial governments.

Overall, the federal budget should focus on the reduction of the rate of the petroleum levy.

This can be made up at the national level by the above-mentioned reforms in federal and provincial taxes.

The year 2026-27 should focus more on the mobilisation of additional revenues from provincial taxes.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

Little is known about the varieties of mangoes worldwide and you will be surprised to know that there are over 2,000 varieties of mangoes that are cultivated globally like Alphonso of India, Tommy Atkins in the USA; Brazil and Mexico considered to be the most common commercial variety globally; and our own Chaunsa and Sindhri.

The list does not stop here; there is also Ataulfo, also known as honey mango from Mexico, and then there is Kent grown in the USA, Peru and Ecuador. These are grown in another part of the world while there is still South East Asia and Australia, which is covered with a golden yellow mango called Nam Dok Mai and then there is Carabao in the Philippines.

The list does not stop here as there is still Kensington pride covering Australia. There is also the most expensive and rare mango in the world, Miyazaki from Japan, also known as “Egg of the sun”. The peak mango season is May through August but because there are so many varieties available in different parts of the world some variety or other of mangoes is available throughout the year.

In Pakistan, the most favoured time when maximum its usage is observed is when the mango season and the holy month of Ramazan fall together, giving the fasting public a chance to taste their favourite fruit during the opening of their fast.

Otherwise, too, when the mangoes are in season they are not only eaten as a fruit but across the globe also form part of daily meals in different ways just as they are popular in sweet and savoury dishes like mango sticky rice in Thailand and mango lassi in Pakistan and Mangonada in Mexico.

In Pakistan, during the mango season, a very popular dish with the Bohra community is ‘Aamrass’, which is part of specially the evening meal in most households. This includes the juice of mangoes, which form the core of this much favoured dish.

The mango is a fruit with a history and references in folklore like the presentation of a mango grove to Buddha himself that he might find rest and shelter in its shade.

So how did this fruit get its name ‘mango’, especially in English- and Spanish-speaking countries? It is presumed that it got this name from Malayam Manna, which the Portuguese adopted as manga when they came to Kerala around 1498 for the business of spices. It is presumed that they were introduced late in the western hemisphere because of difficulty in transporting their seeds, which resulted in their introduction as late as the 1700 when the first seeds were planted in Brazil and they reached West Indies around 1740.

Most of this information is available in Encyclopaedia Britannica and has been recently updated, which also demonstrates the importance of mangoes on a worldwide scale.

The mango is a fruit with a long and documented history that has been carefully preserved just as its taste has been carefully cultivated over the years and through centuries of careful nourishing by dedicated souls who have groomed this fruit, made improvements and whose hard work and dedication have resulted in what is now sold in our streets on pushcarts and in high-end fruit shops for all of us to enjoy.

Why so much focus on this fruit when the market is full of other fruits as well? Ask yourself. Will you replace the mango with any other fruit given the choice?

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

According to Outlook India, he said from the bench: “There are youngsters like cockroaches, who don’t get any employment and don’t have any place in the profession. Some of them become media, some of them become social media, some of them become RTI activists, some of them become other activists, and they start attacking everyone.”

The Chief Justice clarified the following day that his remarks were directed specifically at individuals who had entered professions using fake and bogus degrees, not at India’s youth in general.

He called young Indians “pillars of a developed India.”

India TV News reported that he subsequently told lawyers not to take his remarks “so sentimentally.”

For millions of young Indians, however, the clarification arrived too late. The wound was already open.

Within days, the Cockroach Janta Party was born.

A joke that became a mirror

Abhijeet Dipke, a 30-year-old political communications strategist, founded the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) on May 16, a day after the Chief Justice’s remarks.

The name was a deliberate, satirical jab at the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and its logo, a cockroach on a mobile phone, wore the insult as a badge of honour.

Its self-declared mission is to be the “Voice of the Lazy and Unemployed.”

What happened next stunned even its founder.

In less than a week, the CJP amassed over 22 million Instagram followers, more than double the BJP’s own Instagram audience, which sits below nine million despite the party claiming to be the world’s largest political organisation.

Over 350,000 people signed up formally.

Volunteers took to the streets dressed in cockroach costumes for protests and clean-up drives.

A joke had become a phenomenon.

The CJP’s manifesto pulled no punches.

It called for cancelling the broadcast licences of media houses owned by Mukesh Ambani and Gautam Adani, two of India’s wealthiest industrialists widely perceived as being in the government’s corner, to, as the manifesto put it, “make way for a truly independent media.”

It was the language of satire, yes, but also the language of a generation that has stopped pretending everything is fine.

The world’s largest democracy and its smallest dreams

To understand why millions rallied behind a cockroach, you need to understand what daily life looks like for India’s Gen Z.

Urban youth unemployment in India stands at 14 per cent, nearly three times the national average of around 5 per cent.

For a country that produces millions of graduates every year and has long promised its young people that education is the ladder to prosperity, this is not a statistic. It is a broken contract.

The wounds go deeper. A survey by polling agency CVoter found that more than 60 per cent of Indians aged 18 to 24 feel anxious about their future.

Six in ten respondents said the CJP reflected real frustrations, over unemployment, over inflation, over the leaking of exam papers, including a national medical entrance test that directly affected some 2.3 million candidates.

Young people who had studied for years, who had sacrificed and scraped, found their futures compromised by corruption and incompetence at the highest levels.

This is the India that Modi’s economic narrative — of a rising Vishwaguru, a global power, a $5 trillion economy in the making — has left behind.

The skyline gets shinier; the ground floor gets harder. And when its own Chief Justice looks down at the unemployed youth scrambling on that ground floor and calls them cockroaches, something snaps.

Why the BJP felt the sting

The BJP did not invent India’s problems.

Unemployment, inequality and institutional decay have deep roots that predate Modi.

But after more than a decade in power nationally, and fresh off electoral victories in key states, the party cannot escape ownership of the present.

Power comes with accountability, and accountability is precisely what the CJP was demanding — loudly, irreverently and, crucially, in a language young people actually speak.

The BJP’s discomfort was visceral and telling.

Union Minister Sukanta Majumdar claimed, without credible evidence, that 49% of CJP followers were from Pakistan and only 9 per cent from India, a claim Dipke demolished by posting his own Instagram demographic data showing over 94 per cent of followers were Indian.

Senior BJP leader Kiren Rijiju dismissed the movement by pitying those who “seek social media followers from outside the country,” stopping just short of calling Indian youth anti-national.

Dipke responded sharply: “Why is a union minister labelling Indian youth as Pakistani?”

It is a familiar playbook. When the BJP cannot answer a question, it questions the questioner’s patriotism.

When citizens organise, they become foreign agents. When young Indians express frustration, they are told they are being manipulated by Pakistan, by the opposition, by shadowy foreign hands.

It is a tactic that has worked before. Whether it works on a generation raised online, fluent in irony and deeply suspicious of official narratives, is another matter.

The crackdown and what it reveals

Then came the harder edge of the state.

The CJP’s website was taken down. Its X account was withheld in India following what appears to have been a legal order.

Its Instagram account was compromised. Dipke said his family received threats.

The government has not confirmed any action.

But the Digital Freedom Foundation condemned the X account’s blocking as an arbitrary suppression of free speech.

And the sequence of events — rapid growth, viral manifesto, state shutdown — is a pattern Indians have seen before.

What makes this crackdown particularly indefensible is not just what was silenced, but how.

The CJP was not organising violence. It was not spreading disinformation. It was wielding satire, the oldest and most legitimate tool of political dissent, to hold a mirror up to power.

That the mirror made the government uncomfortable is not a reason to smash it. It is a reason to look harder.

A government confident in its record does not need to shut down satirical Instagram accounts.

A ruling party secure in the love of its people does not need to call those people Pakistani.

The BJP’s reaction to the CJP was not the response of a party wrongly accused.

It was the response of a party that recognised, in 22 million cockroaches, a reflection it could not afford to let others see.

The deeper rot

The BJP has long built its identity on cultural nationalism, Hindu pride and the promise of a strong, decisive leader who would restore India’s greatness.

For many, particularly in the early Modi years, that promise felt real. It generated genuine enthusiasm, genuine hope.

But ideology is not a substitute for governance. Cultural pride does not pay rent. National greatness does not employ graduates.

And when a government uses nationalism as a shield against accountability — when it brands every critic a traitor, every satirist a foreign agent, every unemployed young person a cockroach — it is not practising ideology. It is practising deflection.

The CJP’s manifesto, for all its satirical packaging, identified real targets: a captured media, a compromised judiciary, a political culture that treats the poor as props and the young as inconveniences.

These are not fringe concerns. They are structural. And no amount of Hindutva pageantry changes the fact that a 22-year-old with a degree and no job is not going to feel the glory of a rising civilisation.

Cockroaches survive

The CJP’s founder himself warned that the movement must move beyond social media to survive, that digital followings are fragile, and that real change requires ground-level organisation.

He is right. Viral moments are not revolutions. Twenty-two million Instagram followers do not automatically translate into votes, policy change or accountability.

But what the CJP has done, even if it fades tomorrow, is significant.

It has shown that India’s young people are not apathetic. They are not disengaged. They are not satisfied. They took an insult thrown at them by one of the country’s most powerful judges and turned it into a symbol of defiance that outpaced the ruling party’s own digital presence within a week.

There is a reason the cockroach has survived 300 million years.

It is not because it is loved. It is because it is resilient, adaptable and impossible to fully exterminate, no matter how many boots come down.

India’s Gen Z has chosen its symbol well.

The writer is a seasoned journalist covering the economy and international affairs.

But 2026 has been a brutal season of reckoning. Since returning to the Oval Office, Trump has not simply faced political headwinds — he has been dismantled by his own courts, outmanoeuvred by foreign adversaries, and humbled by the very metrics he swore to own. Nowhere is that gap between promise and reality more visible than in the burning waters of the Persian Gulf.

Iran: A war without a finish line

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a series of strikes against Iran, targeting its nuclear programme, ballistic missile infrastructure, and senior government leadership — including the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Trump promised swift, decisive victory. The world held its breath.

After more than five weeks of fighting, a ceasefire was brokered on April 7-8. It has held only partially and precariously ever since.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas once flowed freely, remains effectively closed. The US has imposed a counter-blockade on ships seeking to use Iranian ports, producing a dual blockade that has sent fuel prices surging and rattled global energy markets. At least 17 merchant ships have been damaged in the crisis, two captured, and 12 seafarers killed or missing. Iran’s leadership, far from being removed, has reconstituted itself under Khamenei’s appointed successor.

The administration’s stated objectives, regime change, destruction of Iran’s missile programme, and control of the Strait of Hormuz, remain unfulfilled. The conflict has shifted to a grinding game of brinkmanship, with no clear exit in sight. France and the United Kingdom have proposed an international defensive mission for the Strait, but only once a sustainable ceasefire is agreed. That agreement has not come.

Trump wanted to be remembered as the president who reshaped the Middle East through strength. He risks being remembered instead as the president who started a war without a defined endpoint, shook the global energy order, and handed Iran the role of aggrieved party on the world stage.

Ukraine: The 24-hour promise that became an open wound

Before he had even returned to the Oval Office, Trump promised to end the Russia-Ukraine war in 24 hours. He said it with the confidence of a man who had never been seriously contradicted. That was then.

The reality in 2026 is more complicated, and in its own way, more damning, than simple failure. Negotiations have lurched forward and backwards across months and continents, from Miami to Paris to Geneva to Abu Dhabi. A 28-point US peace framework proposed that Ukraine cede territory it had not yet lost. A European counter-proposal pushed back. Ceasefires were announced and then immediately violated, with both sides blaming the other.

As recently as May 9, Trump announced a three-day ceasefire agreed to by both Russia and Ukraine for the Victory Day period, calling it potentially the “beginning of the end” of the war. But on the very same day, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told reporters that US mediation efforts had not led to a “fruitful outcome” and had “stagnated” — a candid admission that cut directly across his president’s optimism.

Analysts have noted that Vladimir Putin has been deliberately stalling negotiations, calculating that he can consolidate territorial gains through either a negotiated settlement or continued battlefield pressure. The 24-hour promise is now in its second year. The war grinds on. And the credibility of the United States as an honest broker has been eroded by the very erratic nature of the diplomacy meant to restore it.

The tariff king with no legal throne

Trump opened his second term with characteristic aggression on the economic front as well. Sweeping tariffs on China, the European Union, India, Canada, and Brazil, the so-called “Liberation Day” tariffs, were imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), a legal manoeuvre his administration presented as both bold and bulletproof.

It was neither.

On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled in a landmark 6-3 decision that IEEPA does not authorise the President to impose tariffs, effectively declaring Trump’s entire trade war architecture unconstitutional. The Court was unambiguous: the power to tax imports is a congressional prerogative under Article I of the Constitution, not a presidential one. More than $160 billion in tariffs had been illegally collected, with potential refunds now owed to importers across the country.

The administration responded by announcing replacement tariffs under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 and launching a series of Section 301 investigations to lay the groundwork for further measures. It was a legal retreat dressed as a tactical pivot, and the world noticed the difference. For a president who built his political identity around dominance and deal-making, this was not a strategic retreat. It was a constitutional rebuke.

The prize he could not buy

And then there is the matter of the Nobel Peace Prize, a pursuit that, more than any policy failure, lays bare the psychology driving all the others.

Trump has coveted the prize openly and repeatedly, appearing to believe that enough pressure on Oslo might eventually yield the result he craved. It did not. The Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded its 2025 prize to Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado, who gifted her medal to Trump when the pair met in Washington. The gesture did little to soothe his grievance. Days later, Trump sent an extraordinary text message to Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store, making clear the snub still stung.

In the message, which he circulated widely among world leaders, Trump declared that he no longer feels bound “to think purely of Peace” because the Nobel Committee had not honoured him. He linked this grievance directly to his escalating campaign to seize Greenland, asserting that “the world is not secure unless we have Complete and Total Control of Greenland” — a demand directed at a fellow NATO ally.

The message was met with condemnation across Europe. Norwegian experts noted that Trump was fundamentally mistaken in his belief that the Norwegian government controls the prize, which is awarded by an entirely independent committee. But the factual error mattered less than what the message revealed: a sitting president openly conditioning his commitment to global stability on the receipt of a personal honour, then using its absence to justify territorial aggression against an ally.

It reframes everything. The Iran war was launched without an exit strategy. The Ukraine peace plan was built on shifting sand. The tariffs were imposed without a legal foundation. Each begins to look less like a policy failure and more like the inevitable output of a leader who has always valued the appearance of winning over the substance of governing.

The reckoning

There is a pattern running through each of these episodes: a preference for performance over preparation, and for the announcement over the outcome. Tariffs imposed without legal grounding. Peace initiatives launched without a diplomatic architecture. A war started without a defined endpoint. A Nobel campaign waged as though prestige could be demanded rather than earned.

The portrait that emerges is not of a grand strategist, but of a tactician whose greatest skill has always been the projection of certainty, and whose second term has been a sustained encounter with the limits of that projection. The courts have ruled against him. The peace he promised Ukraine remains elusive. The war he started carries no finish line. And his own words have confirmed what critics long suspected: that for this president, global stability has always been, at least in part, a means to personal validation.

The deals he promised have not closed. The wins he guaranteed have not materialised. And the world, watching carefully, has begun to draw its own conclusions.

The writer is a seasoned journalist covering the economy and international affairs.

This was a mandate built on exclusion, fear, and the systematic declaration that 200 million Indian Muslims do not belong in the political life of their own country.

Consider the numbers. Across the four states that went to the polls — Assam, West Bengal, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu — a total of 104 Muslim MLAs were elected to various assemblies. That is 14.36 per cent of the 723 legislators. In a country where Muslims make up nearly 14 per cent of the population, this figure appears almost proportional.

But here is the damning detail that the Indian media will not highlight: not a single one of those 104 Muslim MLAs belongs to the BJP.

Zero. Not one. Not a single Muslim in the entire country was deemed worthy of a BJP ticket in these elections.

In Assam, where Muslims constitute approximately 34 per cent of the population, the BJP won 82 seats out of 126. Yet the party fielded no Muslim candidates in the entire state. In West Bengal, where Muslims make up 27 per cent of the population, the BJP won 207 seats out of 294. Again, no Muslim candidates.

This is not an electoral strategy. This is a declaration of war, a war waged not with bullets but with ballots. And the BJP is winning.

‘Victory for Hindutva’ — the mask is gone

The BJP’s prospective chief minister of West Bengal, Suvendu Adhikari, did not bother with the usual platitudes about serving all communities. He openly celebrated the result as “a victory for Hindutva” — the Hindu supremacist ideology that envisions India as a nation for Hindus alone.

The mask is now gone. The BJP no longer pretends to be a party of development or good governance. It is a religious movement that has captured the Indian state, and it is using that state to systematically marginalise, humiliate, and terrorise Muslims.

Union Home Minister Amit Shah campaigned on a platform of driving out “infiltrators”,  a coded slur for Muslims, particularly Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam. Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has openly admitted that his government’s 2023 delimitation exercise — which reduced Muslim-majority seats in Assam from 35 to 22 — was designed to “marginalise the influence of the anti-BJP religious group”. Opposition leaders have correctly called it “legalised rigging”.

This is the face of Indian democracy in 2026. A ruling party that openly admits to rigging electoral boundaries to reduce Muslim representation, and then celebrates the results as a victory for Hindu supremacy.

The daily hell of being Muslim in Modi’s India

The 2026 election results did not occur in a vacuum. They are the electoral culmination of a decade of rising violence, state-sanctioned hate speech, and the systematic dehumanisation of India’s Muslim minority.

According to a January 2026 report by the India Hate Lab, India recorded 1,318 hate speech events in 2025 — an average of more than three per day. This represents a 97 per cent increase since 2023.

Of these, 1,289 events contained hateful, violent references to Muslims. The report found that 88 per cent of hate speech events took place in states governed by the BJP or its allies. Among the top 10 individuals responsible for the most hate speech, five are affiliated with the BJP — including Amit Shah, the country’s home minister, who is tasked with protecting all citizens regardless of faith.

The conspiracy theories deployed are not random. They are carefully manufactured: “land jihad” (Muslims plotting to capture Hindu land), “population jihad” (Muslims scheming to outnumber Hindus), “love jihad” (Muslim men conspiring to convert Hindu women through marriage). These narratives are designed not just to win votes but to justify violence.

Union Minister for Minority Affairs Kiren Rijiju — whose job is literally to protect religious minorities — has instead accused the Congress party of becoming the “Muslim League Party,” a slur invoking the party that campaigned for Pakistan’s creation. The BJP’s IT cell chief, Amit Malviya, has echoed this language.

The message is unmistakable: to be Muslim in India today is to be an enemy of the state. To advocate for Muslim political rights is to be a traitor.

Beyond Muslims: The circle of hate expands

The BJP’s majoritarian project does not stop at Muslims. Christians, who make up only 2.3 per cent of India’s population, have become an increasingly visible target.

On Christmas Eve 2025, Hindu hardline groups announced a shutdown in the city of Raipur, claiming “forced conversions” by Christians — a charge repeatedly made despite an absolute lack of evidence. That same day, armed men stormed a shopping mall, vandalising Christmas decorations and disrupting worshipers. Police arrested only six people. They were released on bail within days and greeted with garlands and celebratory processions.

Prime Minister Modi visited a Catholic church in New Delhi on Christmas morning. He did not condemn the violence. He did not mention the arrest. He offered prayers and posed for photographs while his party’s foot soldiers terrorised Christians across the country.

Hate speech targeting Christians rose from 115 events in 2024 to 162 in 2025 — a 41 per cent increase. The “forced conversion” narrative now paints every act of Christian charity, education, or healthcare as a deceptive tool for converting Hindus.

Human Rights Watch: State-sanctioned targeting

In February 2026, Human Rights Watch released its annual World Report, documenting a grim reality that the Indian government has tried to hide from the international community. The report found that India’s BJP-led government “vilified religious minorities” and continued to carry out “unlawful demolitions of homes and properties of Muslims” under the guise of addressing illegal construction.

“Hate speech often linked to Hindu nationalist groups and attacks against Muslims increased,” the report stated. The authorities also cracked down on critics of the government and pressured the media to self-censor.

Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch, said: “The Indian government has normalised violence against religious minorities, marginalised groups, and critics through discriminatory policies, hate speech, and politically motivated prosecutions.”

This is not a fringe opinion. This is the finding of one of the world’s most respected human rights organisations. And the 2026 election results are India’s answer: we do not care.

The trap of reverse polarisation — and why Muslims cannot win

Muslim voters have responded to this onslaught not with indifference but with desperate fear.

In Assam, the All India United Democratic Front — a regional party that historically drew Muslim support — collapsed from 16 seats to just two. Muslim voters have abandoned their own community-based representatives to rally behind the Congress party.

In Assam, 18 of the 19 Congress MLAs elected are Muslims.

In West Bengal, the Congress and its allies have become the primary vehicles for Muslim political expression.

But this is a trap. Every Muslim vote that consolidates behind the Congress is a weapon the BJP uses to accuse the opposition of “minority appeasement.”

The more Muslims appear to vote as a bloc, the more the BJP can claim that Hindus must do the same to defend themselves against the “Muslim threat.”

It is a perfect machine. The BJP creates fear. It exploits the fear. Then it uses the consequences of that fear to justify more fear. And the Muslim community is caught in the middle — crushed between a party that hates them and a party that is too weak and too scared to defend them.

The BJP’s endgame: A Hindu nation

What does the BJP actually want? The answer is no longer hidden. It wants a “Hindu rashtra”, a Hindu nation where other faiths are tolerated as guests but never treated as equals.

The 2026 state elections have brought that vision terrifyingly close to reality. Across five major states, the BJP won historic victories while refusing to field a single Muslim candidate. Its leaders celebrated in the name of Hindutva. Its campaign was built on conspiracy theories about “infiltrators” and “jihad.” Its state governments have redrawn electoral maps to dilute Muslim political power.

And the world watches in silence. Western leaders shake Modi’s hand. Western corporations invest in his economy. Western universities honour him with degrees. All while 200 million Indian Muslims are being systematically erased from the political life of their own country.

The overturning of India

India’s Constitution promises a secular, socialist, democratic republic. The 2026 state elections have confirmed that this promise is being systematically dismantled, not through a coup, not through a revolution, but through the ballot box. Democratically. Legally. And with the enthusiastic support of a Hindu majority that has been trained to see Muslims as enemies rather than neighbours.

The BJP won the 2026 state elections. But the real losers are not the Congress party or the regional outfits. The real losers are the millions of Muslim families who went to sleep on election night knowing, perhaps for the first time, that India is no longer their home.

For 200 million Indian Muslims, the message of 2026 is clear: you may live here. You may pay taxes here. You may send your children to school here. But you will never rule here. You will never be represented here. You will never be equal here.

That is not democracy. That is apartheid by another name.

The writer is a seasoned journalist covering the economy and international affairs.

This gap has widened over time and has become more visible in everyday life, where decisions made by the leaders often seem disconnected from the realities faced by ordinary citizens.

As a result, many people feel unheard and underrepresented, creating the sense that governance is something done to them rather than for them.

It has also produced a repeated cycle of hope and disappointment, where new figures emerge promising change, only to face the same structural limits that have restricted reform for years.

In such an environment, public attention is easily captured, but political trust is far harder to earn.

Visibility, especially in a media-driven age, can create a strong sense of credibility.

Yet in politics, credibility is not built through recognition alone. It is built through consistent performance, strong organisation, and the ability to deliver results within complex systems.

Iqrar-ul-Hassan enters this political space with significant public recognition, largely due to his journalistic career.

His work in exposing corruption and highlighting governance failures has earned him a reputation as a bold and visible media figure.

However, this reputation also raises an important question of whether influence gained through journalism can truly be converted into political authority.

Journalism and politics operate on different principles.

A journalist’s role is to investigate, question, and expose.

A politician’s responsibility is to govern, negotiate, and compromise.

One works from the outside looking in; the other must operate from within the system, often making difficult decisions that involve tradeoffs rather than clear moral positions.

This difference is key when judging whether media credibility can become political capability.

Critics argue that public figures who move from journalism into politics often carry an image of authority that has not yet been tested in governance.

While they may be effective in identifying problems, they are rarely tested in resolving them.

This creates a gap between perception and performance, where public confidence is shaped more by past visibility than by present competence.

Iqrar-ul-Hassan’s political initiative through Awam Raj Tehreek presents itself as a response to longstanding frustrations with traditional politics.

It claims to create space for ordinary citizens and challenge established structures.

This message clearly connects with a public that has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the mainstream parties.

However, the main concern remains whether such a vision can move beyond words into practical political action.

This pattern is not unique to Pakistan.

In India, the Aam Aadmi Party emerged with a similar promise to represent ordinary citizens and challenge traditional political elites.

It gained strong public support and achieved electoral success, especially in New Delhi.

Yet over time, it has also faced criticism, internal tensions, and questions about governance.

Its journey shows that early popularity does not remove the deeper challenges of sustaining credibility and delivering results.

A similar story can be seen in Italy with the Five Star Movement.

It began as a powerful anti-establishment force, attracting voters frustrated with mainstream politics.

However, once in power, it struggled with internal divisions and the realities of governance, which tested its original promises.

These examples show that movements built on public frustration often face their toughest test after gaining attention or power.

Pakistan’s political system is shaped not only by personalities but by deeply rooted structures of power.

Electoral success depends on local influence, financial resources, and established voter networks.

In this environment, movements built mainly on media visibility face clear limits.

Recognition may create momentum, but it does not automatically build electoral machinery or grassroots strength.

This is where questions about leadership credibility become more serious.

A political movement needs more than a well-known figure as its leader.

It requires discipline, clear decision-making systems, and the ability to manage internal disagreements.

Without these, even popular movements risk breaking apart when they face real political pressure.

There is also the issue of consistency. Public trust depends on whether a leader’s actions match their words over time.

For media personalities entering politics, this scrutiny is often stronger.

Any gap between past criticism of the system and present political compromises can quickly raise doubts about sincerity.

Supporters argue that Pakistan needs new voices outside traditional political families, and this reflects real public frustration.

However, critics point out that being outside the system does not automatically make a leader more capable.

In fact, the lack of experience within political institutions can become a disadvantage when dealing with lawmaking, party organisation, and policy delivery.

Iqrar-ul-Hassan’s strength lies in communication and his ability to highlight important issues.

Yet communication is not the same as governance. Politics requires long-term engagement with institutions that are often slow, complex, and resistant to change.

It demands patience and practical decision-making, not just public messaging.

Another concern is the nature of public expectations.

Movements led by well-known figures often generate strong emotional support at the start.

However, this support can be fragile if it is not supported by clear policies and strong organisation.

When expectations are based more on personality than structure, disappointment can follow quickly.

It is also important to consider the wider political environment.

Established parties in Pakistan, despite criticism, have organisational depth and electoral experience that new movements lack.

This creates an uneven field where new entrants must do far more than simply present themselves as alternatives.

The challenge for Iqrar-ul-Hassan, therefore, is not just gaining attention but proving political capability.

The shift from commentator to decision-maker is difficult.

It requires moving from criticism to responsibility, from observation to action, and from clear statements to complex compromises.

Many figures around the world who have made this shift have found it far more demanding than expected.

Internal stability is also important. Political movements often begin with energy, but disagreements over leadership and strategy can quickly appear.

Without strong internal systems, such disagreements can weaken the movement before it fully develops.

Sustainability is another key issue. Media-driven movements can rise quickly, but maintaining momentum requires deep grassroots support, policy planning, and long-term commitment.

Without these, movements risk becoming highly visible but politically weak.

There is also the question of accountability.

In journalism, influence comes from questioning others.

In politics, that same scrutiny is directed back at the individual. Every decision, alliance, and outcome becomes open to public judgment, often at a much higher level.

This does not mean such movements have no value.

They can challenge established narratives and push mainstream parties to respond more seriously to public concerns.

They can also bring new energy into political debate.

However, influence should not be confused with the readiness to govern.

Ultimately, the main question around Iqrar-ul-Hassan’s entry into politics is not whether he is popular, but whether his credibility as a journalist can withstand the demands of political leadership.

This is a test of ability, not intention.

While Pakistan clearly needs reform and fresh ideas, credibility in politics is earned through consistent action, not reputation alone.

The move from media influence to political authority remains uncertain, and at present, it raises more questions than answers.

The most sensible approach is careful observation, where leadership is judged not by promises or popularity, but by performance over time.

The real test now is whether Iqrar-ul-Hassan can prove himself in politics, rather than becoming just another short-lived entrant in the existing political system.

His success will depend on whether he can turn promises into real change and maintain credibility in a field where many new political efforts fail to succeed.

The writer is a seasoned journalist and a communications professional.

He can be reached at tariqkik@gmail.com

It already is.

Two months into a war with Iran that was meant to be swift and decisive, the United States finds itself in a very different contest — one measured not just in military terms, but in time, prices, and political patience.

The Strait of Hormuz is effectively constricted. Tanker traffic is disrupted. Oil markets are rattled. And the president who promised relief at the pump is watching costs climb steadily higher.

This is no longer just a military standoff. It is a test of endurance. And the uncomfortable reality is this: while Washington is trying to force a quick outcome, Tehran is playing for time.

The disruption that reshaped the battlefield

The turning point came early. Following the initial wave of US and Israeli strikes, Iran responded by targeting the artery it has long threatened but rarely choked at scale — the Strait of Hormuz.

Roughly 20 million barrels of oil pass through that narrow corridor each day, about a fifth of global consumption. Even partial disruption sends shockwaves through energy markets.

Washington’s response was forceful. A naval blockade aimed at Iranian-linked exports has intercepted dozens of vessels, costing Tehran billions in lost revenue. On paper, it signals dominance.

But pressure cuts both ways.

Brent crude has surged past $120 a barrel, briefly touching levels not seen in years. Analysts warn that prolonged disruption could keep prices elevated — or push them higher still.

In the United States, gasoline prices are now hovering around $4.40 a gallon. In some regions, increases have come sharply and suddenly.

Voters have noticed.

The political math is unforgiving

Fuel prices are not abstract indicators. They are lived experiences — felt in daily commutes, delivery costs, and grocery bills.

With mid-term elections approaching, the timing could hardly be worse. Narrow congressional margins leave little room for economic discontent.

Even if the conflict de-escalates soon, the effects will linger. Energy-driven inflation does not recede overnight. There is a delay between falling oil prices and relief at the pump — a delay measured in months, sometimes longer.

That lag is politically dangerous.

The administration faces a difficult balance: sustain pressure abroad while containing the economic fallout at home. The risk is that success in one arena may come at the expense of the other.

Tehran’s advantage: patience

Iran’s position is far from comfortable. Its exports are constrained, its economy strained. By conventional measures, it is under significant pressure.

But it is not trying to win quickly.

Iran’s system has spent decades absorbing sanctions and shocks. It is structured for endurance in ways democratic systems often are not. Where Washington faces electoral deadlines, Tehran operates on a longer horizon.

Every week of disruption shifts pressure outward — into global markets, into fuel prices, into American political life.

Iran does not need a decisive victory. It needs time to do its work.

Why time is not on Trump’s side

The White House appears to be betting that Iran will eventually yield under sustained pressure. That assumption has logic. But it collides with a more immediate reality: political time moves faster than strategic time.

Even a rapid resolution would not instantly reverse the damage. Prices would take time to fall. Voter sentiment would take time to recover.

And time is precisely what the political calendar does not offer.

The administration may argue that short-term economic pain is the cost of a longer-term strategic gain. That case is not without merit. But it is also one that voters, facing rising daily expenses, may be unwilling to accept.

Foreign policy victories rarely outweigh domestic discomfort — especially when it is felt at the pump.

A contest of endurance

At its core, this is a clash of timelines.

Washington is trying to accelerate events — force a breakthrough, restore stability, bring prices down before political consequences set in.

Tehran is doing the opposite — stretching the moment, allowing pressure to accumulate where it matters most: in the economies and electorates of its adversaries.

Both sides are betting on time. But they are betting in opposite directions.

The reckoning at the pump

Back at that Georgia gas station, the calculation is already underway. The contractor who once supported Trump says he can absorb the costs — for now.

But only to a point.

No one knows exactly where that point lies. What is clear is this: every day the Strait remains disrupted, every day oil flows are constrained, every day prices stay elevated, the pressure builds.

Each increase leaves an impression. Each visit to the pump becomes a quiet political moment.

The president faces limited options. Escalation risks widening the conflict. Retreat risks projecting weakness. Waiting risks something else entirely.

Because waiting is not neutral. It favours the side that can endure it longer.

And right now, that may not be the United States.

For Donald Trump, time is no longer just a strategic variable. It is a political liability.

And it is working against him.

The writer is a seasoned journalist covering the economy and international affairs.

In Pakistan’s case, however, this “necessity” sits uneasily beside a history of recurring balance of payments crises, chronic fiscal deficits, and a currency that has rarely known stability.

To introduce a volatile asset class into such a system is not modernisation alone; it borders on recklessness.

The visible advantages are real. Bringing unregulated transactions into a legal framework offers the state greater visibility over previously opaque financial flows.

It may improve compliance, widen the tax base, and provide individuals outside the formal banking system with alternative channels for savings and transfers.

In a country where financial exclusion remains significant, this is no small consideration.

There is also the promise of remittance efficiency.

For Pakistan, where remittances are a critical source of external support, blockchain-based channels could reduce costs and delays, allowing more value to reach households.

At a time when every dollar of inflow matters, such gains carry undeniable appeal.

Legalisation also signals openness. It suggests a willingness to engage with emerging financial systems to attract speculative capital and to project regulatory adaptability.

For a government under constant pressure to demonstrate reform, this symbolism is politically convenient.

Yet these advantages are incremental and fragile.

They depend on confidence, discipline, and above all, stability, qualities that Pakistan’s economic history has struggled to sustain.

Against them stands a single factor whose impact is neither limited nor manageable: volatility.

Digital assets derive their value not from productive capacity or sovereign backing but from market sentiment and global liquidity cycles.

Their movements are dictated by forces far removed from Pakistan’s domestic realities.

In stronger economies, such volatility may be absorbed. In Pakistan, it risks becoming an accelerant to existing instability.

The danger is not theoretical.

Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves have repeatedly hovered at precarious levels, often sufficient for only weeks of imports.

In such a context, even a modest shift of capital into speculative digital assets can have disproportionate consequences.

A sudden loss of confidence, whether triggered domestically or abroad, could prompt rapid liquidation and capital flight, placing immediate pressure on the rupee and the already strained reserve position.

What is presented as an avenue for inflow can just as easily become a channel for outflow.

The asymmetry is stark. Inflows are gradual, conditional, and confidence-driven.

Outflows, in moments of panic, are swift and indiscriminate.

For an economy living from one external support programme to the next, this is not a marginal risk; it is a structural threat.

Proponents argue that regulation will mitigate these dangers.

That is an optimistic assumption in a system where regulatory enforcement is uneven and institutional capacity is limited.

Legalisation without robust oversight does not reduce risk; it formalises exposure.

More troubling is the potential entanglement with external commercial and political interests.

Pakistan’s economic policymaking has long been influenced by external dependencies, whether through multilateral lenders or bilateral arrangements.

To add a new layer of dependence, tied to volatile and externally driven financial ecosystems, is to compound vulnerability, not reduce it.

The question, therefore, is not whether digital assets have utility; they do.

The question is whether Pakistan, in its present condition, can afford the risks they carry.

Economic sovereignty is not lost in a single decision; it erodes through cumulative exposure to forces beyond domestic control.

The promise of efficiency and inclusion operates within a narrow band of stability.

Pakistan, by contrast, operates at the edge of it.

To embed volatility into such a system is not reform in any meaningful sense. It is a wager taken from a position of weakness.

For a country with little margin for error, this is not merely experimentation.

It is an invitation to amplify instability. In Pakistan’s case, this is not a leap into the future; it is a gamble with a past that has already warned against such risks.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

The article first appeared in the daily Business Recorder on April 22, 2026

The shortfall in revenues has come after an outstanding performance by the FBR in 2024-25.

Total tax revenues reached Rs 11,745 billion, with an extraordinary growth rate of over 26 per cent. Consequently, the tax-to-GDP ratio at the federal level went up from 8.8 per cent of the GDP to 10.2 per cent of the GDP in one year.

The performance in the first three quarters of 2025-26 has fallen significantly short of the target.

The target was Rs 9,917 billion, whereas the actual collection has been Rs 9,307 billion.

This implies a shortfall already of Rs 610 billion, equivalent to 4.4 per cent of the revised downwards annual target of Rs 13,979 billion.

The original target for 2025-26 of FBR revenues was Rs 14,131 billion.

The required growth rate of revenues in 2025-26 to meet the lower revised target is still high at 19 per cent.

This requires a rise in the tax-to-GDP ratio in 2025-26 of 0.9 per cent of the GDP, from 10.2 per cent of the GDP in 2024-25.

As such, the target for 2025-26 remains ambitious.

What is the performance of individual taxes in the first three quarters? We look first at the income tax.

The target for 2025-26 is Rs 6,967 billion, with a required growth rate of 20.3 per cent.

The level of revenues in the first three quarters of 2025-26 is Rs 4,636 billion, with a shortfall of Rs 235 billion. The growth rate achieved is 12 per cent only.

Sales tax revenues are targeted at Rs 4,580 billion in 2025-26, with a growth rate of 17.4 per cent.

During the first three quarters, the tax collection has been Rs 3,104 billion, with a growth rate of 9 per cent. Consequently, the shortfall already is of Rs 313 billion.

The two smaller indirect tax revenues, the customs duty and the excise duty, have not shown much divergence from their targets.

The shortfall in the first three quarters is only Rs 30 billion in the case of customs duty.

Revenues from the excise duty have exceeded the nine-month target by Rs 5 billion.

Both taxes have shown relatively high growth rates in revenues of above 12 per cent.

There is a need to determine the extent to which the overall shortfall of Rs 610 billion in FBR is due to a divergence from the projected growth rates in the tax bases of different taxes.

The IMF Programme projected growth in the real GDP in 2025-26 is 3.2 per cent.

This growth rate has, in fact, been exceeded in the first two quarters, with the actual growth rate at 3.7 per cent.

The rate of inflation has been somewhat lower at 5.7 per cent, as compared to the projected growth rate of 6.3 per cent.

The tax base of imports has also shown lower growth, with the USD value increasing by 8.0 per cent, as compared to the target growth rate of 8.5 per cent.

There is a major deviation in the projection of one key determinant of the size of the tax base of the customs duty and the sales tax on imports.

The IMF projection for 2025-26 is that the value of the rupee will fall by over 12 per cent by the end of June 2026. However, in the first nine months, there has been no decline.

Adjustment for the lack of depreciation in the value of the rupee implies that the large shortfall of Rs 313 billion in sales tax revenues is largely due to the lower rupee value of imports.

This has probably also contributed to lower revenues from some withholding taxes in the income tax.

There is a need to assess the likely outcome in the fourth quarter of 2025-26 of FBR revenues.

The commencement of the Middle East war prior to the start of this quarter has resulted in a big rise in the level of uncertainty about the global and national economy.

There could be shortages of imports if the stoppage of traffic continues in the Strait of Hormuz.

However, import prices are significantly higher for oil and other imports.

As such, it is not clear what the level of revenues from the sales tax on imports and customs duty will be in the fourth quarter of 2025-26.

The good news is that the highest-yielding tax base of large-scale manufacturing has been performing well.

It has shown a growth rate of 10.5 per cent in January 2026 and 5.8 per cent in the first seven months.

If this high growth persists, then it could also facilitate faster growth in revenues from income tax and sales tax on domestic production.

Finally, the preparations for the federal budget of 2026-27 will start shortly.

The IMF projection is only for a marginal increase in the federal tax-to-GDP ratio of 0.1 per cent of the GDP in relation to the target level in 2025-26.

However, with the likely shortfall of over Rs 900 billion in 2025-26, a bigger increase will be required.

An appropriate FBR revenue target for 2026-27 is close to Rs 14,500 billion, implying a target growth rate of over 12 per cent in a relatively uncertain environment.

The IMF Programme also envisages a significant increase in the provincial tax-to-GDP ratio from 0.9 per cent of the GDP in 2025-26 to 1.3 per cent of the GDP in 2026-27.

Clearly, the taxation measures in the forthcoming provincial budgets will be of greater importance.

Efforts will have to be made by the provincial governments to develop the agricultural income tax, property-related taxes and the sales tax on services.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

This article first appeared in the daily Business Recorder on April 7, 2026

“I sometimes wonder whether the Western media’s attempt to black out some words or give a twist to a report that does not quite capture the spirit of an event….why are you laughing?”

“Because Western media these days is not only not capturing the spirit of any event but also the letter – the coverage of the Gaza genocide…”

“Fair enough, but I am baffled. Europe has one of the highest literacy rates in the world, and yet they blocked Russian Television four years ago because, perhaps, they thought that their literate populations are unable to distinguish between truth and…”

“Propaganda wars are ongoing concurrently with real wars so perhaps they reckon that…”

“Gotcha, but today all those engaged in actual wars are also engaged in propaganda wars – see wars have not changed dramatically in terms of ammunition used – drones and missiles as opposed to air power – I hope we have adjusted…”

“Back off – anyway, there are some countries that are more equal than others in terms of launching wars – actual, propaganda wars, and the use of expletives is a new weapon that President Trump…”

“Speaking of some countries being more equal than others, let me quote Mark Twain to you – he said under certain circumstances, profanity provides a relief denied even to prayer.”

“That makes sense because I heard there is a regular prayer meet at the White House.”

“Hmmm, let me quote Kurt Vonnegut, an American author who wrote that profanity and obscenity entitle people who don’t want unpleasant information to close their ears and eyes to you.”

“So the Iranians…”

“Make of that what you will, the language of diplomacy, however, militates against the use of profanity or obscenity.”

“But the head of government is normally not a diplomat, right…”

“Neither is a titular head of Defence.”

“Titular like The Khwaja who has used expletives or the actual as in…in…”

“The Chairman of the Pakistan Cricket Board?”

“Yep, though the two US diplomats shuttling from one conflict zone to another are kinda…”

“Have never uttered an expletive publicly.”

“True anyway, I have not missed a single Mel Brooks movie, who said I have been accused of vulgarity, I say that’s bull sh…”

“Shush.”

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

The article first appeared in the daily Business Recorder on April 7, 2026

International accounting firms, financial analysts and media will never look at this side of the picture as that contradicts and conflicts with their economic interests. However, after working in different spheres of finance and politics the author is almost sure that whatever is happening and whatever is expected to happen in future irrespective of the result of the war which the USA started on February 28, 2026.

Even the remote possibility of the complete devastation of Iran and a change of regime will not change the ‘course of events’.

The following four (4) arguments are relevant to the conclusion made in the end:

a. Oil-rich Middle Eastern countries — primarily Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait — have invested roughly USD3.7 trillion to over USD5 trillion in foreign assets through their sovereign wealth funds (SWFs).

These funds invest globally in tech, sports, banking, and infrastructure to diversify revenue away from oil. Sovereign wealth funds from Gulf countries manage about one-third of global state fund assets, often acting as “white knights” for companies in the West.

Investments are heavily focused on Western companies (e.g., Uber, Boeing, Nintendo) and large-scale projects.

Key players, which include the Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF), Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), and Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), which are actively expanding their global portfolios.

b. Qatar holds extensive ownership of luxury London hotels, primarily through state-backed entities like the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) and Katara Hospitality, holding over £100 billion in British assets.

Top holdings include The Ritz (£800m), Savoy, Connaught, Grosvenor House, and the upcoming Chancery Rosewood, plus iconic assets like Harrods.

The details and value are: The Ritz London: sold to a Qatari investor for approximately £800 million in 2020.

The Chancery Rosewood: part of a huge redevelopment of the former US Embassy in Mayfair, acquired by Qatari Diar for ~£500m in 2009.

c. Following the start of the conflict on February 28, 2026, the UAE faced significant financial pressure, with Dubai and Abu Dhabi stock markets losing a combined USD120 billion in value within the first month.

While there were reports of increased wealth movement toward Switzerland — with cash held by UAE-based individuals in Swiss banks rising by 40 per cent — and some investors moving assets to Singapore/Hong Kong, specific figures for capital transferred from Dubai to London are not explicitly quantified in the provided search results.

Key financial impacts and capital movements identified following February 28, 2026, include:

i. The Dubai Financial Market General Index dropped by about 16 per cent in the month following the war’s start.

ii. Wealthy individuals began re-evaluating their positions in the Gulf, shifting focus to safe-haven jurisdictions, with a noted 40 per cent increase in funds linked to UAE-based individuals moving to Swiss banks.

iii. While some investors were re-evaluating risks, some analysts indicated this was a “recalibration of risk” rather than a massive, immediate capital flight.

iv. Banks in the Gulf faced a potential USD307 billion deposit flight risk if the conflict continued to worsen, according to S&P reports from mid-March 2026.

v. In response to the economic disruption, Dubai announced a USD270 million relief package on March 30, 2026, to support businesses and residents.

d. BlackRock announced that it was restricting withdrawals from its flagship $26 billion HPS Corporate Lending Fund (HLEND) on March 6, 2026. Investors sought to withdraw 9.3 per cent of their holdings (roughly USD1.2 billion) in the first quarter of 2026, which exceeded the fund’s 5 per cent quarterly limit.

BlackRock enforced the 5 per cent cap, paying out approximately USD620 million but locking the remaining withdrawal requests.

This was done to protect the fund from having to sell illiquid, long-term private credit loans at a loss during a period of market volatility.

The concept the author intends to present would be easier to describe with reference to cases (a) and (b) above. Qatar owns a USD 1 billion Hotel in London by the name of The Ritz.

(To be continued tomorrow)

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

This article first appeared in the daily Business Recorder on April 5, 2026

Global benchmarks had risen for weeks while the government artificially held prices without the fiscal buffers to sustain subsidies. But the policy mix is wrong.

During an external shock, petroleum levies, climate levies, and customs duties should, at a minimum, be frozen.

The government’s failure to do so reflects a deeper failure to broaden the tax base, leaving fuel consumers to shoulder the fiscal burden.

The pricing methodology is equally flawed. With roughly 75 per cent of diesel produced locally, benchmarking against imported diesel (FOB Platts) inflates prices and generates windfall refinery margins.

A crude-based benchmark would be more appropriate, but the government did not take that step.

Petrol is up 43 per cent from pre-war levels; diesel, 86 per cent.

Both are now the highest in the region in dollar terms. April-June inflation will likely reach 12-14 per cent.

The arithmetic is stark. Last week, the landed price of petrol was USD 140/barrel (Rs246/litre) and HSD USD 262/barrel (Rs460/litre), against a crude oil landed price of around USD 150/barrel.

HSD premiums were extraordinarily high at roughly USD 110/barrel.

If Pakistan imported all its diesel, a full pass-through would be unavoidable. But it does not, as 75 per cent of HSD is locally refined.

Pakistan imports about 85 per cent of its crude and refines it into petrol, diesel, and furnace oil.

At current margins, local refineries are earning roughly USD 110/barrel on diesel, against a normal margin of around USD 10/barrel.

That is a windfall transferred in its entirety to consumers in the form of higher prices.

Refineries will argue that HSD profits offset losses elsewhere: approximately $20/barrel on petrol and USD 50/barrel on furnace oil.

Plus, there are losses on LPG too. Fair enough, but the proportions are wildly skewed.

From a single barrel, Pakistan’s refineries typically yield two units of diesel and one unit each of petrol and furnace oil.

The net windfall is roughly USD 35/barrel, or Rs62/litre.

The government should compensate refineries for losses on petrol and furnace oil, but not allow them to pass through diesel windfalls uncapped.

The question is simple: should refineries be allowed a once-in-a-generation gain at the cost of a spike in inflation for every Pakistani? When posed to the authorities, the response was: we do not want to nationalise refineries.

That is not nationalisation; it is wartime regulation. Moreover, PARCO, the country’s largest refinery, is 60 per cent government-owned.

Pakistan already tightly regulates most of its energy chain. E&P companies, IPPs, and OMCs all operate under regulated margins.

Applying the same logic to refineries during this crisis is neither radical nor unprecedented.

The government worries that altering the pricing formula may disrupt fuel supply.

That risk is manageable: guarantee refineries their normal margins regardless of volatility and cover the downside.

The supply chain stays intact; the inflationary shock is absorbed where it should be.

The math works. Keeping other product prices and levies constant, and regulating refinery margins on locally produced HSD, the blended diesel price, weighted 75 per cent local and 25 per cent import at international prices, could fall from Rs460/litre to around Rs380/litre.

Plus, the government can lower prices by another Rs35/litre through customs duty, most of which is passed on to the refineries.

These measures would be fiscally neutral, and they would prevent the inflationary tsunami that higher diesel prices will unleash across transport, food, and fertiliser costs.

A windfall tax, which the government is now floating, is the wrong instrument.

It will not undo the inflationary damage already baked in, and 60 per cent of any revenue would have to be shared with the provinces.

The parallel with gas policy is instructive. Pakistan prices its domestically produced gas at USD 3-4/MMBtu, a fraction of imported RLNG, and allocates some of it to fertiliser production.

That deliberate policy keeps food security intact at a time when many countries face shortages or pay prohibitive prices.

The same logic applies to diesel, which is largely domestically produced.

Pay market price on the crude you import and recover it from consumers, but do not let refineries capture windfall margins that bear no relation to underlying costs.

Free-market pricing is a peacetime luxury. When the conflict subsides, the government can return to the current formula and pursue deregulation, as the petroleum minister has signalled.

But right now, the priority must be energy and food security, not refinery balance sheets.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

The article first appeared in the daily Business Recorder on April 6, 2026

The nature of the hospitality industry reveals that there cannot be a sale at a big premium and even if that can be done the amount collected in cash will be useless in Qatar as the Qataris will not be able to use this fund productively in their own country as they have no population and climate to enjoy the wealth.

The Qataris tried the same by having the FIFA World Cup; however, now 90 per cent of their stadiums are being wasted.

Though the money is available, people are not here to take advantage of that money. If so, the money is useless.

The other example is even clearer. These investment funds own a substantial part of Boeing. The company makes aeroplanes. What is the value of that investment? Is it the market capitalisation at the New York Stock Exchange? Theoretically, it is so; however, in effect, it is a piece of paper and a seat of Chairman on the Board.

The real assets of the company which are (a) technology, (b) manpower, (c) employment and social benefits, (d) intellectual property, etc, would always remain outside the control of these investment funds.

It is, therefore, important to see what real benefit is attained by ME investment funds by being the owner of a company like Boeing.

Whenever there will be a clash of interest in the political sense of ME countries with the west Boeing will not be there.

Even if we assume that over the time 100 per cent of pilots in Emirates would be Emaratis the real question will be ultimate beneficiaries of the facilities being provided by the airline.

This is a universal reality which proves that money, people and civilisation are linked to geography and demography. The value of an asset is only to the extent of its economic realisation.

So for the inevitable reasons the real usefulness of these assets only lies in countries which are climatically and geographically away from Qatar may be Europe, USA, China or India.

For Qatar and the Qataris the benefit can only be there when the asset exists outside Qatar and the Qataris enjoy the same there.

Except that it is useless for the person and the people who generated that or where it was generated.

Ultimately, it will end in banks lockers and economies and people of the west will be benefited.

In this situation the author will value the asset in a different form. As an accountant this valuation method may be called ‘Usefulness in the Country of Origin’ method.

This is an economic reality. In the author’s view that on this measure the value of this USD $ is not more than 10 per cent of the gross value and the remaining 90 percent benefit arising from such wealth will be for people and places different from where it is generated. This is called ‘Virtually Frozen Assets’.

The questions which Middle Eastern investment funds have to ask, ignoring the confusion created by accounting standards and traditional valuation methods, is whether this wealth would ever be useless for the people of their own country whilst living in their own country. Recently, the author visited Doha.

The taxi driver who was a Qatari informed him that almost 90 per cent of the Qataris spend most of their lives in the West.

This number is increasing. For the remaining parts they become a contributor and big spender for high streets in the West supporting their economies. This is a trap of crude capitalism.

One can buy Patek Philippe or Hermes to a limited extent as these commodities do not provide respect and honour which is given to an educated and civilised person in any western society.

The owner of Harrods, Muhammad Al Fayed, is an example. Thus in the end, the result is a farce.

This has happened by past royalties in Europe and Asia.

We should not forget three rich monarchs: the Nizam of Hyderabad (USD 2 billion in 1940), King Farouk of Egypt (USD 2.3 billion) and Reza Shah of Iran (USD 1 billion). Unlike these royalties the wealth referred to in above is not the personal wealth of royalties.

This is the wealth of state investment funds, etc., however, when the substance and utility is examined the result is almost the same.

The royalties referred above left the wealth which at that time was larger than anyone else’s.

This means that like past royalties these Middle Eastern countries are in a trap.

As of early 2026, reports indicate that Saudi Arabia has drastically scaled back — and in some respects, effectively stalled — The Line, the flagship 170-kilometre linear city project within the broader NEOM development project championed by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS).

The reason is not only the shortage of funds but the ultimate usefulness.

In the times to come AI will be for the people needing comfort. The Saudis are already living in comfort.

They want luxury, which is not the result of AI. Luxury can only be provided by the natural environment, which is available in abundance in Pakistan’s northern areas, on both sides of the Line of Control, or in Switzerland in Europe. Nature cannot be recreated by science.

Learning from history which is undeniable, it would be better for these funds to completely relook at their real balance sheet.

The answer lies in diversification of investment to places like Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia, China, India and others.

Furthermore, there should be investment in people of disadvantaged countries so that there is a positive political image in case of any political and social upheaval.

Economics and politics have never changed in the manner as has been predicted. So, whatever was taught in Harvard and Cambridge was made useless by one five-foot tall person by the name of Deng Xiaoping.

Pakistan has an opportunity of over USD 200 billion investment and will provide better results than anywhere else in the world. The only thing to change is the lens through which the future is seen; and a correct method of valuation of asset is adopted.

(Concluded)

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

This article first appeared in the daily Business Recorder on April 6, 2026.

The war involving the United States, Israel and Iran is often framed as a unified campaign to contain Tehran. That narrative is convenient and misleading. What is unfolding is not one war, but three overlapping conflicts, each driven by distinct and often conflicting strategic goals. The result is not coherence, but chaos, with profound consequences for global politics, economic stability and human security.

At its core, this is a conflict defined by divergence. Washington wants to limit escalation. Tel Aviv appears to favour sustained military pressure. Tehran, meanwhile, is not trying to win a conventional war at all. It is reshaping the battlefield by using geography, economics and global risk as tools of leverage.

Understanding these competing agendas is essential to understanding why this war is proving so difficult to end.

Israel’s strategy: deterrence or dominance?

Israel’s approach cannot be viewed in isolation from its broader regional conduct. From Gaza to southern Lebanon and the West Bank, Israeli military doctrine has evolved beyond immediate defence into a wider strategy of dominance.

The scale of destruction in Gaza, the persistence of settlement expansion, and repeated cross-border strikes have reinforced a perception, widely held across the Global South, that Israel is pursuing more than security. Human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have repeatedly raised concerns about disproportionate use of force and violations of international humanitarian law.

What some analysts describe as the concept of “Greater Israel” remains a powerful undercurrent in the thinking of hardline leadership, blurring the line between defence and expansion.

For Israeli policymakers, however, the logic is clear: eliminate threats before they fully materialise. Iran’s so-called nuclear and missile programmes are viewed as existential risks. From that perspective, strikes on strategic infrastructure are framed not as escalation, but necessity.

Yet this strategy has clear limits. Military superiority has not translated into decisive outcomes. Instead, it has entrenched hostility, widened the theatre of conflict, and increased the risk of multi-front escalation, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to maritime tensions in the Gulf.

In effect, Israel’s pursuit of deterrence risks producing the very instability it seeks to prevent.

Israel’s war, America’s burden

The war is increasingly defined by misalignment.

Israel is pursuing its own strategic agenda, even when it diverges from American priorities, while Washington finds itself managing consequences rather than shaping outcomes. This is no longer a quiet concern among analysts. It has entered mainstream political debate in the United States.

A growing number of voices are asking whether this is still America’s war — or whether Washington has been pulled into a conflict driven largely by Israeli decisions.

This is not a unified war. It is a misaligned one. And that misalignment is pushing the region toward deeper instability.

Israel’s agenda: escalation beyond alignment

Israel’s actions across Gaza, Lebanon, Iran and the West Bank reveal a consistent pattern: decisive, often pre-emptive, and at times indifferent to broader strategic consequences.

The war in Gaza remains the clearest example. Tens of thousands of Palestinians have been killed, according to UN-linked estimates, with civilians making up a significant share. Entire neighbourhoods have been destroyed, and humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate.

Beyond Gaza, Israel has expanded its operational scope. Strikes in Lebanon risk opening a second front, while settlement expansion in the West Bank continues to entrench control over occupied territory.

More significantly, Israel has demonstrated a willingness to escalate even when the United States signals caution, raising a fundamental question: if Israel is setting the pace, is Washington still leading, or merely reacting?

Washington’s dilemma: following rather than leading

For the United States, this creates a strategic imbalance.

Washington’s priorities are clear: avoid a wider regional war, protect global energy flows, and prevent long-term military entanglement. Yet developments on the ground suggest these priorities are being steadily undermined.

Backchannel diplomacy involving Egypt, Turkiye, and Pakistan reflects ongoing efforts to contain the conflict. But events continue to move in the opposite direction.

Inside the United States, criticism is no longer marginal, it is structural.

Lawmakers such as Bernie Sanders and Chris Murphy have openly questioned both the morality and strategic logic of continued support. Congressional unease is growing, with calls for ceasefire pressure and reassessment of US involvement.

But the political strain extends far beyond Capitol Hill.

A widening divide in American politics

The implications are increasingly visible across American society, and increasingly costly for Donald Trump.

Rising fuel prices, inflation and economic uncertainty have turned foreign policy into a domestic liability. For many Americans, the war is no longer a distant geopolitical contest; it is shaping everyday life.

At the same time, Trump is facing mounting political backlash. Across the United States and internationally, protest movements, most notably the No Kings rallies, have emerged as a visible expression of public anger. These demonstrations reflect a broader frustration with war-driven policies, perceptions of unchecked power, and the human cost of prolonged conflict.

The protests are not isolated. They are part of a deeper rupture in political consensus.

Within conservative circles, questions are being raised about whether US involvement serves national interests or primarily reinforces Israeli objectives. Among Democrats, calls to limit war powers and push for de-escalation are gaining urgency.

If the conflict continues or expands, the political consequences could intensify. A prolonged war risks eroding public support, fracturing bipartisan consensus, and complicating Trump’s political future at a critical moment.

Iran’s strategy: retaliation, control and economic pressure

Iran has responded with a calibrated but high-impact strategy.

Rather than limiting its actions to Israel, Tehran has expanded strikes across the region, targeting US bases in the Gulf. This raises the risk of a wider war while drawing additional actors into the conflict.

At the same time, Iran is leveraging geography. The Strait of Hormuz remains its most powerful strategic asset, carrying roughly 20 per cent of global oil supply.

Recent developments suggest Tehran is experimenting with tighter operational control near key shipping lanes, signalling its ability to disrupt global trade without engaging in full-scale war.

This dual strategy carries serious implications: It increases the likelihood of regional expansion; it exposes vulnerabilities in US defence commitments; and it raises doubts among Gulf allies about long-term security guarantees.

Credibility is central to deterrence. Once questioned, the balance begins to shift.

The economic fallout is already visible. Oil prices have surged, shipping costs have risen, and analysts warn of a potential global energy shock with far-reaching consequences.

A conflict shaped by one dominant agenda

What makes this conflict particularly dangerous is its imbalance.

The United States seeks containment.

Iran seeks retaliation and leverage.

Israel is pursuing a broader strategy of military dominance and regional reshaping.

These agendas do not align.

As a result, the conflict is not moving towards resolution. It is drifting towards expansion.

The imperative for recalibration

If current trends continue, the risks will deepen. The war could expand across multiple fronts. Economic shocks could intensify. Political divisions, especially in the United States, could widen further.

At the centre of this crisis lies a fundamental question: Can an alliance function when one partner sets the course, and the other absorbs the consequences?

The longer this war continues, the clearer the answer becomes. Military power can drive escalation, but it cannot align competing agendas.

Only diplomacy can do that.

But diplomacy requires control, and control requires alignment.

At present, neither exists.

The writer is a seasoned journalist covering the economy and international affairs.

But oil markets are not governed by supply alone, especially in times of war. They are shaped by perception, risk, and strategy. And in that arena, Iran is playing a very different game.

The uncomfortable reality for policymakers in Washington is that this waiver may soften the edges of the crisis, but it is unlikely to resolve it. Tehran’s objective is not to maximise exports. It is to maximise pressure.

A conflict engineered to spread economic pain

Since the outbreak of direct confrontation involving Israel and the U.S., Iran’s response has been calculated and asymmetric. Rather than matching force conventionally, it has targeted the arteries of the global economy, including energy infrastructure, shipping lanes, and regional stability.

The escalation around the South Pars gas field, shared with Qatar and forming part of the world’s largest natural gas reserve, marked a turning point. What was once a regional conflict has evolved into a systemic threat to global energy security.

By threatening flows through the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow passage that carries roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil and a significant share of liquefied natural gas, Iran has effectively turned geography into leverage. Its message is simple. If it cannot export oil freely, the world may not either.

Energy analysts warn that if disruptions persist, prices could spike sharply, with some cautioning that oil could move towards extreme levels under worst-case scenarios.

Prices tell the real story

The numbers already reflect the scale of the shock. Before the conflict escalated in late February, Brent crude hovered near 60 dollars a barrel. Within weeks, it surged past 100 dollars, with spikes approaching 110. That is an increase of more than 50 per cent.

Natural gas markets have reacted even more sharply. European benchmark prices have climbed to multi-year highs, while in the U.S., gasoline prices have risen by roughly 25 to 30 per cent, feeding directly into inflation and household costs.

This is not just volatility. It is systemic stress. Rising energy prices ripple across economies, pushing up manufacturing costs, transport expenses, and food prices. Growth forecasts are being revised downward, while central banks face renewed pressure to contain inflation.

This is precisely the environment Iran appears to be cultivating, one where the economic cost of war becomes politically difficult for its adversaries to sustain.

Why Iran may not fully use the waiver

At first glance, the U.S. assumption seems straightforward. More Iranian oil should help lower prices. But this overlooks Tehran’s incentives.

Even with sanctions eased, logistical constraints remain. Shipping routes are under threat, insurance costs for tankers have surged, and the risk premium on Gulf energy flows remains elevated.

More importantly, Iran benefits from tight markets. Elevated prices strain Western economies, fuel inflation, and create political pressure, particularly in sensitive election periods.

In such a scenario, Iran does not need to maximise exports. It only needs to maintain uncertainty. And uncertainty keeps prices high.

The global economy under strain

The ripple effects are already visible across major economies.

In Europe, industrial heavyweights like Germany and Italy face renewed energy pressure, reviving fears of a slowdown. The United Kingdom, heavily reliant on gas-fired electricity, is particularly exposed to rising gas prices.

In Asia, vulnerability is even sharper. Japan depends almost entirely on imported energy, much of it routed through Hormuz, while India imports around 85 to 90 per cent of its crude, leaving it exposed to both price shocks and currency stress.

For more fragile economies such as Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the consequences are severe. These include fuel shortages, inflation spikes, and emergency economic measures.

Gulf States: caught in the crossfire

Even energy-rich Gulf states are not immune.

Countries like Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar face a paradox. Prices are high, but exports are constrained due to security risks and disrupted routes. In some cases, energy infrastructure has come under direct threat, further complicating supply flows.

At the same time, tourism, a key pillar of economic diversification in the Gulf, is taking a hit. Regional instability is deterring travel, disrupting aviation networks, and weakening investor confidence.

The broader economic model of the Gulf, built on stability, connectivity, and reliable energy exports, is now under strain.

A shrinking toolkit in Washington

The U.S. waiver on Iranian oil does not stand alone. It follows earlier moves to ease restrictions on other oil supplies and relax domestic shipping rules. This suggests that Washington’s economic toolkit is being stretched.

Yet the effectiveness of these measures remains limited. Energy markets respond not just to supply volumes but to geopolitical risk. As long as the Strait of Hormuz remains vulnerable and regional tensions persist, additional barrels are unlikely to stabilise prices in a meaningful way.

Strategy outweighs supply

The central flaw in the current approach lies in treating this as a conventional supply shock. It is not. This is a strategic disruption that is being sustained and amplified.

Iran is not simply reacting to war. It is reshaping the economic battlefield. By keeping markets on edge, it increases the global cost of conflict and shifts pressure onto its adversaries.

In that context, the sanctions waiver may offer temporary relief, but it does not change the underlying dynamics. Iran does not need to maximise exports to benefit. It only needs to maintain instability.

Until the geopolitical conditions for stability are restored, global energy markets will remain hostage, not just to supply, but to strategy.

The writer is a seasoned journalist covering the economy and international affairs.

In today’s globalised economy, wars rarely remain confined to the battlefield. The current conflict threatens to disrupt energy markets, destabilise Gulf economies and place millions of migrant workers at risk. These developments could directly shake Pakistan’s fragile economic foundation.

Gulf instability and the Pakistani diaspora

The first and most immediate impact is being felt across the Gulf economies, particularly Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait, which host millions of Pakistani workers.

Iran’s retaliatory strategy has already expanded beyond direct confrontation with Israel. Missile and drone attacks targeting US-linked facilities and strategic infrastructure in the Gulf have heightened fears that the conflict could spread across the entire region. Even if large scale destruction is avoided, the threat alone is enough to disrupt investment, energy production and major development projects.

For Pakistan, the stakes are enormous.

Around 2.5 to 3 million Pakistanis live and work in Saudi Arabia, while roughly 1.6 to 1.8 million are employed in the United Arab Emirates. Hundreds of thousands more reside in Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain. These workers are deeply embedded in the Gulf’s construction, services and energy sectors.

Any economic slowdown triggered by war, whether through security restrictions, falling investment or damaged infrastructure, could quickly affect employment opportunities for migrant labour.

A prolonged conflict could therefore threaten the livelihoods of millions of Pakistani workers abroad.

The remittance lifeline

The vulnerability is not only social but macroeconomic. Overseas Pakistanis send between $30 billion and $35 billion annually back home, making remittances one of Pakistan’s largest and most reliable sources of foreign exchange.

This money supports millions of households, but it also performs a critical function for the national economy. Remittances help stabilise the rupee, strengthen foreign exchange reserves and offset Pakistan’s persistent current account deficit.

A disruption in Gulf labour markets would therefore ripple directly into Pakistan’s economic system. Even a modest decline in remittances could weaken the country’s balance of payments position and place additional pressure on its already strained finances.

Pakistan’s economy remains structurally fragile, characterised by low exports, high external debt and recurring fiscal crises. Remittances have long acted as a financial buffer against these weaknesses.

If Gulf economies slow down due to war, that buffer could quickly erode.

The Strait of Hormuz and the oil shock

Another major shock comes from the disruption of the strategic Strait of Hormuz, the narrow maritime corridor through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes.

With tensions escalating and shipping under threat, energy markets have been thrown into turmoil. Oil prices have surged towards 100 dollars per barrel, reflecting fears that supplies from the Gulf could be significantly disrupted.

For Pakistan, a country that imports most of its energy needs, such a surge represents a direct economic blow.

Energy imports already consume a substantial portion of Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves. Higher global oil prices therefore, translate almost immediately into domestic economic stress.

Fuel prices and inflation pressure

The Pakistani government has already been forced to respond to rising energy costs.

Islamabad recently announced a sharp increase of Rs55 per litre in petrol and diesel prices, one of the largest fuel hikes in recent years. The increase was largely driven by global oil market volatility and concerns about supply disruptions linked to the conflict in the Gulf.

For ordinary Pakistanis, higher fuel prices are never just about petrol.

Transport costs rise, electricity generation becomes more expensive and the price of essential goods quickly follows. Inflation, already a persistent challenge for the country, is likely to accelerate further.

If oil markets remain volatile and prices climb higher, the government may be forced to implement additional fuel price increases. For a population already struggling with the cost of living, such measures could have catastrophic social and political consequences.

A difficult geopolitical dilemma

The crisis also places Pakistan in a complicated diplomatic position.

Islamabad maintains strong historical and strategic ties with Saudi Arabia, including defence cooperation agreements and long-standing military collaboration. Pakistani officers have served in Saudi defence structures, and the two countries have often supported each other in times of crisis. Above all, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, which formalises decades of security cooperation and establishes a framework for collective defence.

If the conflict expands and Gulf states become more deeply involved, Pakistan could face pressure to provide military or logistical support to Riyadh.

Such involvement would carry serious political risks.

On one hand, supporting Saudi Arabia would reinforce Pakistan’s strategic partnership with the Gulf, a relationship that brings financial assistance, energy supplies and employment opportunities for millions of Pakistanis.

On the other hand, entering a conflict that pits Saudi Arabia and the United States against Iran could create significant regional complications. Pakistan shares a long border with Iran and maintains complex diplomatic, economic and sectarian sensitivities tied to Tehran.

Direct involvement could inflame internal tensions while complicating Pakistan’s already delicate regional diplomacy.

Walking a strategic tightrope

For Pakistan, the expanding Middle Eastern war highlights a difficult strategic reality. The country’s economic stability is closely tied to the Gulf, yet its geopolitical environment requires careful balancing between competing regional powers.

If the US Israel Iran conflict widens further, Pakistan will face three simultaneous challenges. It must protect its diaspora, safeguard the flow of remittances and avoid entanglement in a broader regional war.

In an interconnected world, distant conflicts often have immediate consequences. For Pakistan, the stakes are far higher than geography might suggest. A war unfolding thousands of kilometres away could reshape the country’s economic stability, energy security and foreign policy choices for years to come.

The writer is a seasoned journalist covering the economy and international affairs.

The government has justified the hike by citing rising international oil prices triggered by conflict in the Middle East. That explanation is partly valid.

Pakistan imports the majority of its petroleum and is therefore vulnerable to global supply disruptions.

But the deeper problem lies not in the crisis itself — it lies in the country’s chronic lack of preparedness and policy choices that amplify the pain for ordinary citizens.

The hidden tax in every litre

One of the most overlooked aspects of Pakistan’s fuel pricing is the massive tax component embedded in the final price.

Even before the latest hike, the government was already collecting significant revenue through the petroleum levy and other charges on every litre of fuel.

In fact, the latest adjustment reportedly includes an additional Rs20 per litre increase in the petroleum levy, pushing the government’s total tax collection on petrol to roughly Rs120 per litre when all taxes and duties are combined.

For ordinary consumers, this means a substantial portion of the pump price reflects government revenue rather than the actual cost of oil.

Over the past two years, Pakistan’s reliance on petroleum levy has grown dramatically, with annual collections projected to reach over Rs1.4 trillion.

Fuel has effectively become one of the state’s most dependable revenue streams.

This growing dependence on fuel taxation raises serious concerns about whether price hikes are driven purely by global market pressures or by the government’s fiscal needs.

The strategic weakness few talk about

Another alarming issue is Pakistan’s limited capacity to maintain strategic oil reserves.

Unlike many countries that store petroleum for several months to cushion sudden market shocks, Pakistan typically maintains stocks for only a few weeks.

This leaves the country extremely vulnerable whenever global supply routes face disruption — particularly in regions like the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of the world’s oil supply passes.

Without sufficient stockpiles, Pakistan has little choice but to react immediately to international price spikes.

The absence of long-term strategic reserves means that every geopolitical crisis quickly turns into a domestic economic crisis.

Countries with large petroleum reserves can absorb temporary price shocks and stabilise domestic markets. Pakistan, however, lacks that buffer.

Inflation’s domino effect

Fuel price increases never remain confined to petrol pumps.

Diesel powers Pakistan’s transport network and much of its agricultural machinery.

When diesel becomes more expensive, transportation costs increase, food prices rise, and inflation spreads across the economy.

A Rs55 increase, therefore, does not just affect motorists.

It impacts farmers transporting crops, truckers delivering goods, small businesses moving supplies, and ultimately households already struggling with rising living costs.

Shared sacrifice — or selective sacrifice?

What makes the situation more difficult for many citizens to accept is the perception that economic sacrifices are not being shared equally.

If the situation were truly as difficult as described, critics argue that the government could have considered alternative measures before passing the full burden onto consumers.

For example, authorities could have reduced or temporarily suspended fuel allowances for government officials, limited the use of large-engine official vehicles, or imposed restrictions on luxury cars with engine capacities such as 2600cc or 3500cc.

Such measures would at least signal that the state is willing to curb its own consumption before asking the public to absorb higher costs.

Instead, the perception persists that while citizens are asked to pay more at the pump, the culture of official privilege remains largely untouched.

A structural failure, not just a crisis

The government has framed the price hike as a temporary response to extraordinary circumstances.

But the truth is that Pakistan’s energy vulnerability has been decades in the making.

The country still lacks meaningful strategic oil reserves, sufficient domestic refining capacity, robust public transport systems, and serious energy diversification.

Without these reforms, every geopolitical shock — whether war, shipping disruption, or currency depreciation — will continue to trigger sudden and painful price increases.

A warning for the future

The Rs55 petrol hike may be explained as a response to global turbulence, but it also serves as a warning.

Pakistan’s energy policy remains reactive, tax-heavy, and structurally fragile.

Until the country builds strategic reserves, reduces its dependence on fuel taxation, and invests seriously in energy security, the same cycle will repeat.

Each global crisis will bring the same announcement, the same justification — and ultimately the same outcome: the bill is handed to the Pakistani public.

The writer is a seasoned journalist covering the economy and international affairs.

What began as decades of mistrust, ideological hostility and strategic rivalry has gradually developed into open military confrontation, with consequences that reach far beyond the Middle East.

The situation is no longer limited to political speeches, economic sanctions or indirect clashes through regional allies.

Instead, it now carries the risk of sustained warfare between powerful states, each with advanced military capabilities and strong international connections.

Although the fighting is centred in one region, its economic and political shockwaves are being felt across continents.

In today’s interconnected world, no major conflict remains local for long.

The conflict has unsettled financial markets, disrupted trade routes, deepened global political divisions and raised fears of a wider war that could involve additional countries.

For nations such as Pakistan, which lie close to the theatre of conflict and maintain relations with multiple sides, the crisis presents serious security risks as well as complex diplomatic challenges.

The roots of the confrontation stretch back many years. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, relations between Iran and the United States deteriorated sharply.

The revolution replaced a pro-Western monarchy with an Islamic system that strongly opposed American influence in the region.

In response, Washington imposed sanctions and pursued policies designed to isolate Tehran.

Over time, mistrust hardened into open hostility. Diplomatic relations were severed, and both sides frequently accused each other of destabilising the Middle East.

Israel, for its part, has long viewed Iran’s nuclear ambitions and missile development as existential threats.

Israeli leaders have repeatedly stated that they cannot allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, arguing that such an outcome would threaten Israel’s very survival.

Iran, however, insists that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes, such as energy production and scientific research.

The disagreement over nuclear development has been one of the most sensitive and controversial issues in international diplomacy over the past two decades.

Tensions have also been fuelled by Iran’s support for armed groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and other regional allies.

Israel views these groups as hostile forces positioned near its borders.

Meanwhile, Iran sees them as part of a broader strategy to resist Israeli and American influence.

These rivalries have often been fought indirectly through proxy conflicts in countries such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen.

However, as hostilities intensified and military strikes became more direct, the risk of a broader regional war increased dramatically.

One of the most immediate global consequences of this conflict has been economic instability, especially in energy markets.

A key concern is the security of the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow but crucial waterway through which a large share of the world’s oil supply passes each day.

Even the possibility of disruption in this area can cause alarm in the global markets.

Oil traders react quickly to any sign of danger, and prices can rise sharply within hours of new developments.

When oil prices increase, the effects are felt everywhere.

Transport costs rise, manufacturing becomes more expensive, and food prices often climb as well.

Inflation, which many countries have struggled to control in recent years, can worsen rapidly under such pressure.

Higher energy costs not only affect motorists filling their cars with petrol, but they also influence the entire economic system.

Airlines face rising fuel bills, shipping companies increase freight charges, and factories pay more for electricity.

Businesses usually pass these higher costs on to the consumers.

For developing countries that rely heavily on imported fuel, the burden is especially severe.

Their trade deficits widen as they spend more on energy imports.

Their currencies may weaken against the dollar, making imports even more expensive.

Inflation reduces the purchasing power of ordinary people, particularly those on fixed incomes.

In poorer societies, even modest increases in food and fuel prices can push millions closer to poverty.

Social unrest may follow if governments are unable to provide relief.

Financial markets are also highly sensitive to geopolitical conflict. Investors generally dislike uncertainty.

When the threat of war grows, stock markets often fall as investors shift their money into assets considered safer, such as gold or government bonds.

This movement reduces the capital available for business expansion, infrastructure projects and job creation.

Companies may delay investment decisions until the situation becomes clearer.

As a result, global economic growth can slow, affecting employment and incomes across many regions.

Supply chains, already strained by previous global crises such as the pandemic and regional wars, face further disruption during periods of conflict.

Insurance premiums for ships travelling through high-risk zones increase sharply.

Some shipping companies reroute vessels to avoid potential danger, leading to longer delivery times and higher transport costs.

Essential goods, including medical supplies, machinery parts and food products, may take longer to reach their destinations.

These delays can harm industries that depend on steady supplies of raw materials.

Beyond economics, the political consequences of the war are equally profound. The conflict has exposed deep divisions within the international community.

Many countries have criticised military actions and called for restraint, arguing that respect for sovereignty and international law must be upheld.

Debates within the United Nations have been intense, particularly at meetings of the United Nations Security Council, where member states have struggled to agree on a unified response.

When powerful countries disagree, global institutions often find it difficult to act decisively.

The war has also influenced shifting alliances among major powers.

Countries such as Russia and China have taken positions that reflect their own strategic interests, sometimes in contrast with Western governments.

This growing polarisation risks deepening a new era of global rivalry reminiscent of past Cold War divisions.

Instead of cooperating on shared challenges such as climate change, poverty reduction and global health, nations may focus increasingly on military competition and strategic positioning.

Within the Middle East, the conflict threatens to draw in neighbouring states.

Countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey are closely monitoring developments, aware that instability could spill across borders.

Regional organisations, including the Gulf Cooperation Council, face pressure to coordinate responses while avoiding direct involvement in hostilities.

If the fighting were to widen significantly, it could engulf multiple states, transforming a limited confrontation into a major regional war with global implications.

Public opinion has played an important role in shaping government responses.

Across many Muslim-majority countries, large demonstrations have taken place condemning violence and expressing solidarity with the affected populations.

In Western societies, public debate has become increasingly polarised, with strong opinions expressed in parliaments, universities and on social media.

Governments must balance domestic political pressures with strategic alliances and long-term national interests.

In democratic systems, leaders are accountable to voters, which makes foreign policy decisions more complex during times of crisis.

For Pakistan, the conflict presents a particularly delicate and sensitive situation.

Sharing a long border with Iran, Pakistan cannot ignore developments next door.

Balochistan lies along the frontier, and any instability in neighbouring areas could create security challenges, including refugee flows, smuggling or cross-border militant activity.

Managing border security without provoking tensions requires careful planning and clear communication.

Economically, Pakistan is vulnerable to rising oil prices because it imports much of its energy.

Higher global prices increase the country’s import bill and put pressure on foreign exchange reserves.

Inflation at home may rise, affecting food, transport and electricity costs.

For a population already facing economic pressures, prolonged instability in global energy markets could create additional hardships.

Government subsidies, if expanded to protect consumers, may further strain public finances.

Diplomatically, Pakistan maintains relations with both Iran and the United States, while also expressing consistent support for Palestinian rights.

Balancing these relationships demands caution and skill. Islamabad has repeatedly called for dialogue and de-escalation, emphasising the importance of resolving disputes through negotiation rather than force.

By advocating for restraint in international forums and offering support for peaceful dialogue, Pakistan can attempt to position itself as a responsible regional actor.

However, this neutrality must be credible and consistent to maintain trust on all sides.

The humanitarian dimension of the conflict must not be overlooked. Civilian populations often suffer the most during wars.

Homes, hospitals and schools can be damaged or destroyed. Families may be displaced from their communities, creating refugee crises that affect neighbouring countries.

Humanitarian corridors and ceasefires are necessary to allow aid agencies to deliver food, medicine and shelter.

Protecting civilians is not only a moral duty but also a legal obligation under international humanitarian law.

The way forward must focus firmly on peace and diplomacy.

An immediate ceasefire would be a first step in reducing tensions and preventing further loss of life.

Continued military strikes only deepen mistrust and make compromise more difficult.

International monitoring mechanisms could help ensure compliance and build confidence between the parties.

Serious diplomatic engagement must also resume.

Negotiations should address the core concerns of each side, including security guarantees, nuclear transparency and non-interference in neighbouring states.

Confidence-building measures, such as advance notification of military exercises or the reopening of communication channels, could reduce the risk of accidental escalation.

Economic incentives may also encourage compromise.

Gradual sanctions relief, regional trade cooperation and investment opportunities could provide tangible benefits linked to peaceful behaviour.

Regional powers and neutral states can assist mediation efforts.

Multilateral diplomacy offers the best chance of achieving a lasting settlement.

Reviving respect for international law and strengthening global institutions are equally important.

When countries believe that rules are applied fairly and consistently, trust in the international system can slowly be rebuilt.

Ultimately, war rarely produces clear or lasting winners in the modern world.

The interconnected nature of global finance, trade and politics means that even distant nations feel the consequences of conflict.

The confrontation involving Iran, Israel and the United States is not merely a regional dispute; it is a global crisis with economic, political and humanitarian costs that affect millions far beyond the battlefield.

For Pakistan and many other countries, the priority must be to prevent escalation, promote dialogue and support a negotiated settlement.

Only through sustained diplomacy, mutual compromise and genuine respect for sovereignty can lasting peace and regional stability be achieved.

The writer is a seasoned journalist and a communications professional.

He can be reached at tariqkik@gmail.com

Selecting the right combination of technologies is no longer about picking what is new or efficient, but target market, customer centricity, and relevance in future are highly relevant as well.

A tech stack, which includes everything from programming languages and frameworks to databases and cloud platforms, defines how a business functions and evolves.

Yet, as companies grow and audiences diversify, making technology decisions has become more complex.

Personalisation is now an expectation, and businesses need to serve customers across geographies, cultures, and economic groups.

With this shift, glocalisation, thinking globally but acting locally, has become a guiding principle.

Companies are building many markets simultaneously and the tech deployment must keep pace.

Tools such as predictive analytics and real-time responsiveness are the lifelines of modern business as they help organisations anticipate trends, adjust experiences, and respond quickly.

If a tech stack is not built to support agility, the business will struggle to adapt.

That is why alignment with the customer needs is the real benchmark.

Companies must move beyond surface-level efficiency and consider whether their technology choices genuinely serve the people who use their platforms every day.

Global competition has reshaped consumer expectations. Price and quality still matter, but so do speed, design, and trust.

A few seconds of lag or a confusing checkout process can be enough to send users elsewhere.

That is why the right technology combination must deliver more than clean code or strong security, but a seamless experience.

A flexible backend, intuitive interface, scalable infrastructure, and easy deployment are just the beginning.

What matters most is the ability to grow with the users as their expectations evolve.

Real-world examples help clarify this shift. Netflix adopted microservices architecture supported by Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Apache Kafka to streamline how data was processed and delivered, ensuring its millions of viewers never had to deal with buffering.

Airbnb built a mobile-first user experience using React Native and GraphQL, enabling quick access across devices without compromising performance.

Shopify combined Ruby on Rails with React.js to create a platform that was not only secure but also responsive and flexible for e-commerce businesses around the world.

These were not arbitrary decisions; they were rooted in customer insight, strategic foresight, and a willingness to experiment with purpose.

Companies with a future vision have helped clients navigate a range of digital challenges, often guiding them toward frameworks that balance innovation with reliability.

Whether working with fast-growing startups or established institutions, the focus should always be on strategic alignment.

It encourages selecting technologies that are built to last, supported by strong developer communities, and capable of evolving without disruption, making choices that reflect not only today’s demands but tomorrow’s possibilities.

How does a company gain this edge of user friendliness? This branding comes straight from thinking through customer centricity and understanding the client’s needs and designing around them and planning to meet the challenges of the foreseeable future.

Scalability, performance under pressure, and long-term security are critical, too, but the availability of talent and the community around a framework will determine the best.

A tool that seems cutting-edge but lacks reliable support or developer interest might become a liability.

Such aspects need to be made a part of talent development, and a developer should have a vision as well as technical prowess.

Cost, maintainability, and flexibility all matter, too. While hype can drive interest in new tools, the real measure of success is whether the tech choices support business goals consistently.

According to Gartner’s 2023 Tech CEO Research report, 72% of high-tech leaders across North America and Europe expected growth despite global uncertainty.

Their confidence stemmed from clear execution strategies and sustained investment in relevant technologies.

This growing emphasis on technology signals a fundamental shift in how businesses must approach their digital foundations.

A tech stack is no longer a static decision or the sole domain of IT.

It is a dynamic, strategic asset that shapes customer experience and builds long-term trust in the brand through operational excellence.

Companies should invest in technology with a mindset of continuous evolution, ensuring their stack is flexible enough to adapt, experiment, and scale with changing needs.

The true competitive edge lies in a tech strategy built not just for today, but ready for what comes next.

Companies need to ask meaningful questions and stay grounded in user needs, as technology choices, when made with insight and empathy, can unlock new levels of creativity, efficiency, and impact.

The writer is a senior investigative journalist with a career spanning 37 years on all the media formats. He can be reached at zubairkidy@yahoo.com

Despite these advantages, the sector has consistently underperformed, constrained by a combination of feedstock shortages, ageing infrastructure, weak policy frameworks, and limited downstream integration. Reviving this industry is, therefore, not only an economic necessity but also a strategic imperative for Pakistan’s broader industrial development and export competitiveness.

Petrochemicals are necessary for modern life. They form raw materials for plastics, synthetic fibres, fertilisers, construction materials, automotive components, electronics, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural inputs. Countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar have successfully leveraged their oil and gas reserves to develop robust petrochemical sectors that have transformed their economies.

Pakistan, while not as resource-rich, possesses enough refining capacity, gas infrastructure, and domestic market demand to establish a competitive petrochemical industry if the right policies and investments are implemented. Currently, the country remains heavily dependent on imported polymers such as polyethylene and polypropylene, as well as solvents and intermediates, which places pressure on the foreign exchange reserves and increases production costs for local manufacturers.

Although companies like Engro Polymer & Chemicals Ltd have contributed significantly, particularly in PVC production, the overall sector remains underdeveloped, compared with the regional competitors.

A major challenge for Pakistan’s petrochemical industry is feedstock security. Reliable and affordable supplies of natural gas, naphtha, or ethane are important for the operation of chemical plants. Frequent gas shortages and shifting government priorities have created uncertainty for industrial users.

When gas is diverted to domestic consumers or power generation, chemical plants face interruptions, which discourages both domestic and foreign investment. Without long-term feedstock agreements at competitive prices, investors are reluctant to commit the billions required to build new petrochemical complexes. A clear, stable national policy that balances the needs of all the stakeholders is, therefore, needed to attract investment and ensure consistent production.

Another significant barrier is outdated infrastructure. Many of Pakistan’s refineries and chemical plants were constructed decades ago and require modernisation to enhance efficiency, safety, and environmental performance.

Modern petrochemical facilities rely heavily on automation, advanced process control systems, predictive maintenance, and energy integration to reduce operational costs and carbon emissions. Upgrading domestic plants demands substantial capital and access to technical expertise, including exposure to global best practices in plant operation, risk management, and process optimisation.

Syed Muhammad Arif, a Chartered Professional Chemical Engineer, exemplifies the expertise needed to strengthen Pakistan’s petrochemical industry. With more than 16 years of experience in operations, project commissioning, safety management, and process optimisation, gained both internationally at Qatar Chemicals and locally at Engro Polymer & Chemicals, he shows how experienced professionals can help modernise plants, transfer knowledge, and apply global safety and operational standards.

Exposure to the world-class ethylene production facilities and advanced safety systems has enabled him to gain the technical knowledge required to manage complex chemical operations to global standards.

Such professionals play their role in knowledge transfer and the modernisation of domestic plants, as they bring experience in process hazard analysis, plant turnarounds, and adherence to the international safety and operational standards.

This combination of local and international experience demonstrates how Pakistani engineers can bridge gaps in technical capacity, operational reliability, and safety culture. Engineers with such exposure can mentor younger professionals, helping them adopt modern practices and digital tools for efficient plant operations.

Safety and environmental compliance are also key priorities for a competitive petrochemical sector. Global markets, particularly in Europe and Britain, demand strict adherence to environmental, social, and governance standards. For Pakistan to export higher-value chemical products, plants must comply with the international environmental and safety regulations.

Experienced professionals in Process Safety Management and structured safety leadership help align local operations with global standards, using risk assessments, incident investigations, and management systems to enhance safety, protect assets, and improve plant performance.

Limited downstream integration remains another significant obstacle. Pakistan produces some basic petrochemicals, but value addition is minimal. Instead of exporting raw materials or importing finished products, the country would benefit from integrated petrochemical clusters, where refineries, crackers, polymer units, and processing industries operate in close proximity.

This approach, successfully implemented in places such as Ras Laffan Industrial City in Qatar, reduces transportation costs, improves energy efficiency, and strengthens supply chains.

The government can facilitate such clusters by providing reliable infrastructure, transparent regulations, and public-private partnership models that attract investment while offering stable operational conditions.

Financing these projects is another concern. Petrochemical complexes require substantial capital investment, often amounting to several billion pounds. Local financial institutions in Pakistan have limited capacity to support such large-scale, long-term financing, making foreign direct investment and joint ventures essential.

Attracting international partners requires not only a strong domestic market but also political stability and predictable regulatory policies. Clear and consistent rules, long-term contracts, and stable tax regimes are necessary to instill investor confidence.

Human capital development is equally important. While Pakistan produces thousands of engineering graduates annually, practical industrial experience is often lacking. Collaboration between universities and industry is the need of the hour to ensure curricula reflect modern petrochemical processes, digital control systems, and sustainable practices.

Engineers like Syed Muhammad Arif, with expertise in distributed control systems such as Yokogawa and Honeywell, can mentor young engineers in these technologies, bridging the gap between academic knowledge and practical industrial skills.

Digitalisation and advanced process analytics also offer opportunities for improvement. Predictive maintenance, process simulation, and data-driven optimisation can increase output, reduce downtime, and improve operational reliability, even in existing plants. Energy transition trends add another layer of complexity. Although petrochemicals will remain indispensable, global pressure to reduce carbon emissions is increasing.

Pakistan’s new investments in the sector should incorporate energy efficiency measures, waste heat recovery, and, where feasible, carbon capture technologies. Cleaner production methods will not only ensure regulatory compliance in export markets but also enhance operational efficiency and long-term competitiveness.

However, pricing and policy distortions further complicate investment planning. Inconsistent gas tariffs, subsidies, and unpredictable energy pricing create uncertainty for industrial users. A transparent, market-based feedstock pricing mechanism and long-term supply agreements would reduce risks for investors and enable better financial planning. Stable policies are also needed to encourage both domestic and international companies to commit to the long-term development of the sector.

Reviving Pakistan’s petrochemical industry will require coordinated action from the government, industry, financial institutions, and academia. While large-scale investment, stable governance, and clear strategic policies are needed, the potential benefits are significant; reduced imports, improved foreign exchange reserves, high-skilled employment, and the growth of downstream manufacturing industries.

Pakistan already has the human capital to manage and operate world-class facilities. Experiences in plant operations, safety systems, project commissioning, and process optimisation exemplify the professional expertise that can drive industrial modernisation.

If Pakistan successfully combines professional expertise with strong policy support, modern infrastructure, and strategic international partnerships, it can develop a resilient and competitive petrochemical industry. This is not merely a matter of constructing factories; it involves building systems, capabilities, and standards aligned with the global best practices.

Over time, such an approach can transform the industry from a reliance on imports and fragmented operations to a fully integrated, high-performing, export-oriented sector. The journey will demand patience, vision, and consistent effort, but the foundational elements, industrial base, engineering talent, and strategic location already exist within the country.

Continued dependence on imports will perpetuate foreign exchange pressures and limit industrial growth, while strategic investment in the petrochemical value chain can unlock economic, technological, and environmental benefits. Ensuring feedstock security, upgrading ageing infrastructure, strengthening safety and environmental compliance, developing downstream integration, and skilled professionals are all crucial steps.

With vision, professionalism, and sustained commitment, Pakistan can awaken its petrochemical industry from its dormant state and position itself as a competitive player in the regional and global markets, transforming potential into tangible industrial and economic outcomes.

The writer is a seasoned journalist and a communications professional.

He can be reached at tariqkik@gmail.com